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model of political accountability with variation in complexity across policy areas. We
find that when relative policy area complexities are sufficiently high and symmetric,
bundling policy areas may lead to higher total effort, selection of more more competent
politicians and better resistance to policy capture by special interests than unbundling.
The opposite is true when policy area complexities are sufficiently asymmetric. While
the effect of the possibility of interest group capture under unbundling conforms to
standard intuitions, we show that under bundling: (1) interest groups may have neg-
ative spillover effects across policy areas under bundling; (2) the presence of interest
groups may decrease or increase effort under bundling and reverse the welfare ordering
of institutions both ways. Transparency of agent’s actions may have positive as well
as negative consequences for the Principal under bundling, generally decreasing utility
discrepancies between multiple equilibria. Further, transparency’s overall effect is to
increase the relative appeal of unbundling.
∗We thank Avi Acharya, Peter Buisseret, Gail McElroy, Sandy Gordon, Lewis Kornhauser, Johannes
Lindvall, Shawn Ramirez, Franois Salanie´, Francesco Squintani, Jean Tirole and seminar audiences at the
IAST, the LSE, and Emory University for helpful comments and suggestions. Previous versions of this paper
were presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest and European Political Science Associations (2014,
2015) where we received valuable feedback. Le Bihan gratefully acknowledges support through ANR Labex
IAST.
†Associate Professor, Wilf Family Department of Politics, NYU, e-mail: dimitri.landa@nyu.edu
‡Research Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, e-mail: patrick.lebihan@iast.fr
1
1 Introduction
One of the central dimensions of institutional variation across political jurisdictions and lev-
els of government concerns the concentration and division of responsibility among public
officials. While in some jurisdictions voters elect a single executive charged with administer-
ing a bundle of policies across issue dimensions, in others, they elect several officials, each for
a distinct subset of the policy area. This variation in the bundling of policy areas is notable
at the state and local levels in the US and is gaining prominence as an important institu-
tional factor to be considered in constitutional design more broadly (Besley and Coate, 2003;
Marshall, 2006; Berry and Gersen, 2008; Gersen, 2010; Calabresi and Terrell, 2008).1 To take
one of the starkest examples of variation among elected officials: the Governor is the single
elected state-level executive in Maine and New Hampshire, and one of two in New Jersey, but
one of nine in South Carolina and Washington; the average across all states is over a half of
that range (Berry and Gersen, 2008).2 But the variation in the extent of bundling of policy
authority occurs in the non-elected positions as well: the authority granted to individual
members of government cabinets often expands and narrows across time and with different
office holders3; the policy authority over a given area may be assigned to an existing or to a
newly created agency (Ting, 2002; O’Connell, 2006; Biber, 2009).4
A key concern with respect to the bundling of policy areas is political accountability.
Because bundling affects the range of signals that political principals receive about their
agents’ performance, the range of choices that principals have to respond to them, and,
through those, the actions of the agents themselves, it fundamentally influences the agency
problems at the core of the relationship between political principals and agents. Yet, with
the few exceptions we discuss below,5 these effects have received little attention, despite the
burgeoning political economy scholarship on accountability6 and the apparent ubiquity and
1Following Berry and Gersen (2008), we refer, throughout, to the relevant institutions as bundling and
unbundling.
2Separately elected positions in various states include the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, Attorney
General, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Comptroller General, Agriculture Commissioner,
Insurance Commissioner, Superintendent of Education, and others.
3In many parliamentary democracies, this phenomenon is the rule, rather than the exception; major au-
thority domain reshuffles in the UK and Israeli government cabinets after their respective 2015 parliamentary
elections provide most recent examples. A related phenomenon can be observed in presidential democracies,
such as the U.S., where the office of the President often usurps from and, less often, returns policy control
over particular issue areas to cabinet members. Some of the best known examples here include the appoint-
ment of policy “tzars” within the office of the President, with ultimate control over, e.g., the drug policy,
bailout of the auto industry, the prosecution of foreign policy with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc.
4The cases in point include the accretion of authority over policy areas by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration; the separation of the border control and immigration services in the U.S. following the
re-organization of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the creation of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service alongside the U.S. Forest Service.
5Most notably, Besley and Coate (2003) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2015).
6Examples of the theoretical work on agency problems in the context of politicians’ career concerns include
Ashworth (2005); Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 2008); Lohmann (1998); Persson and Tabellini
(2002)
2
variation in policy (un-)bundling.
We develop a career-concerns model of political accountability that focuses on two factors
that we believe are particularly relevant for analyzing the welfare implications of policy (un-
)bundling. The first is the extent of complexity of policy areas, which is a key salient feature
of the policy-making environment in our model under the various institutional conditions we
consider. The second factor is the susceptibility of the policy-making process to the capture
by special interests, to which we turn in the latter half of the paper, after characterizing
the institutional implications of (un-)bundling in the classic binary political principal-agent
setting. The outcome of policy-making has a complementarity between effort and competence
in the sense that the policy return on the Agent’s effort is higher, the higher her competence.
Under bundling, principals choose whether to retain the incumbent agent after observing
two policy outcomes, which are stochastically induced from the incumbent’s choices, her
competence level, and the degree of policy area complexity; under unbundling, principals
make distinct retention choices for each agent assigned to a given policy area after observing
similarly induced policy outcomes in that policy area.
Complexity of a policy area may depend on how hard it is to find the right “type” of
office holder for that area. It may also depend on the specific details of the choice setting
facing the office holder: e.g., is there much institutional knowledge or prior experimentation
in this policy area to minimize chance—as opposed to choice—driven consequences? How
sovereign is a given policy maker in determining the policy?7 The analysis we present
shows that policy area complexity fundamentally affects the incentives and behavior of both
political principals and agents and, with those, the relative merits of policy (un-)bundling.
In particular, our core set of results points to the social welfare-maximizing properties of
“moderate” retention incentives – promising retention for at least partial policy success. We
show that, under policy bundling, such retention rules can sustain maximal effort by the
incumbent in the middle range of policy complexity and make it superior to unbundling
in terms of both incentivizing the office holders and selecting those of high quality. A key
(partial) intuition for this effect in our model is that, in the presence of multiple policy areas
under bundling, such retention rules afford the office holder a kind of insurance: the success
in some policy areas may compensate for the failure in others, and that can, in effect, give the
political principal greater effective power over the office holder under bundling than under
unbundling; the incumbent will find “purchasing” such insurance attractive precisely when
the complexity of each policy area is neither too high nor too low.
The strategy profile associated with the equilibrium with “moderate” retention incentives
is better for the principal than the profile in the “strict” incentives equilibrium, in which
the principal requires policy successes in both areas to retain the agent and the agent does
her best to deliver that outcome. The latter equilibrium exists when the complexity of each
policy area is low and, in that environment, gives an edge to policy bundling because of better
quality of agent selection.8 When values of policy complexity are sufficiently asymmetric,
7Both of these aspects of task complexity are present in the seminal discussion in March and Simon
(1958) and have been developed in subsequent literature on political economy of organizations and firms,
e.g., Campbell (1988); Garicano and Wu (2012).
8While the complementarity of action and type in our model ensures multiplicity of equilibria with differ-
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neither of these retention rules is consistent with equilibrium play, and the welfare comparison
of preferred institutions may favor the unbundling, especially so when agents’ choices are
transparent to the principals.
One of our primary interests in the paper is in characterizing the interaction between the
different incentives associated with policy (un-)bundling and the susceptibility of the policy-
making process to capture by special interests. Concern with capture by special interests
is a mainstay of the debates about political accountability of elected officials (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994), Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 7-9), Persson and Tabellini
(2002, Chapter 7), Snyder and Ting (2008), Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2012). A policy
influence that is disproportional and at the expense of the majority is a prima facie challenge
to effective representative governance. The ability of special interests to capture the policy-
making depends on how easy it is for the voters to resist it with electoral incentives to
the office holders.9 Intuitively, unbundling of policy areas gives voters an opportunity to
target their electoral incentives for separate policy areas separately, without a sacrifice of
a captured policy area of secondary importance for getting a preferred policy in the area
of primary interest. This intuitive logic is at the core of the most influential accounts of
the institutional incentives with respect to policy bundling (Besley and Coate, 2003; Berry
and Gersen, 2008), which endorse policy unbundling as an institutional arrangement that
allows for finer tailoring of incentives to the agents and lowers susceptibility to capture.
This logic operates in our model as well, and, in fact, we show that its consequences may
be even more detrimental to principal’s welfare under bundling than at first appears: the
expectation of the policy capture by the interest group in a given policy area may have
negative spillovers for the incumbent’s choice in other policy areas, leading to a more global
failure of policy-making under bundling.
But our analysis also suggests that the accountability channels affect principals’ and
agents’ expectations in ways that can undercut and even reverse the welfare implications
suggested by this logic. Indeed, we show that when complexity of both tasks is relatively
high, policy bundling may be better at preventing interest group capture than unbundling.
By increasing the agents’ return on investment into effort in the form of the sanctioned
office benefit, the moderate incentives retention rule increases the agents’ resistance to the
unsanctioned benefit from the sale of policy to the interest group. Perhaps more surprisingly
still, we show that under bundling, the presence of the interest group, with preferences
adverse to those of the voters, can increase the range of circumstances under which the voters
can anticipate higher performance from the incumbents. This occurs because under the
moderate retention incentives, the presence of a potent interest group can weaken the signal
about the incumbent (in-)competence from policy failures. While the net result of interest
group influence is quite complex, these effects suggest that the effect of policy bundling on
the likelihood of policy capture is more nuanced than has been recognized.
ent levels of principal and agent welfare (see Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999b); Ashworth, Bueno de
Mesquita and Friedenberg (2015)), the set of equilibria at a given vector of primitives does not generically
include both strict and moderate incentives equilibria.
9See Prat (2002b), Prat (2002a), Ashworth (2006), Gordon and Hafer (2007), Bernhardt, Caˆmara and
Squintani (2011).
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Among other results we provide, perhaps the most interesting concern the different incen-
tives arising from the transparency of policy-making under different institutional conditions.
To our knowledge, the present paper offers the first formal analysis of the implications of
transparency in a political accountability model with career concerns (Holmstro¨m, 1999)10,
uncovering a number of implications that are new to the literature. At the most general level,
we find that transparency has the effect of decreasing utility discrepancies between multiple
equilibria in the multi-task accountability game (under bundling). Transparency eliminates
the utility highs that stem from high effort across policy areas: it can worsen agent incentives
and selection, reduce the size of the political contribution that the interest group needs to pay
and distort effort away from the policy area in which there is an interest group; but it also
eliminates the utility lows from being “trapped” in the low-expectations, low-performance
equilibria. Relative to a given equilibrium, the welfare consequences of transparency depend
on the underlying complexity of the policy areas. Further, transparency’s overall effect is to
increase the relative appeal of unbundling.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin, in Sections 2 and 3, with
the baseline analysis of the binary relationship between the principal and the agent(s) under
bundling and unbundling institutions. In Section 4, we introduce into that setting an interest
group whose preferences are opposite of the principal’s, and consider the consequences for
the equilibrium play and the welfare comparison of institutions. In Section 5 we discuss some
of the considerations of robustness and compare our results to the results in related models.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Actors and Order of Play
We model an interaction between a Principal (denoted P ) and one or two Agents. (In Section
4, we expand the model by adding an Interest Group.) There are two tasks, a1, and a2. We
consider two institutions. In the first one, called bundling, a single Agent (denoted A) is
responsible for both tasks. In the second institution, which we call unbundling, there are
two Agents (denoted A1 and A2 respectively) each responsible for one of the two tasks. On
each of these two tasks the responsible Agent can choose whether to exert effort. We denote
ai = 0 the choice of the Agent not to exert effort on task i = 1, 2, and ai = 1 the choice to
exert effort.
The outcome on task i, oi ∈ {s, f}, where s stands for success and f for failure, depends
stochastically on the effort choice ai and on the competence of the Agent responsible for
task i. Specifically, we assume that each Agent can be of one of two types θ ∈ {θL, θH} with
10The bulk of the previous studies on the implications of transparency in accountability settings are set
in the context of signaling models (see Prat, 2005; Fox, 2007; Ashworth and Shotts, 2010; Morelli and
Van Weelden, 2013; Fox and Van Weelden, 2012). In these models, when the electorate observes the incum-
bents actions and those actions are in themselves informative as to the incumbents type, incumbents may
be led to act according to how the principal expects a good incumbent to act a priori, instead of choosing
those actions which are in fact best for the electorate. This mechanism is unavailable in the career-concerns
models, given their setting of symmetric uncertainty.
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Pr(θ = θH) = pi ∈ (0, 1). If the Agent chooses to exert effort on task i, i.e. chooses ai = 1,
then the probability of success is eLi if the Agent is of low competence θL, and e
H
i if the
Agent is of high competence θH with 0 ≤ eLi < eHi ≤ 1. Further, if the Agent chooses not to
exert any effort, then the probability of success is 0 independent of his type.
We adopt a career concerns framework and assume that the competence of each Agent
is not observed by any of the actors ex ante. The distribution of types is commonly known,
however. It follows that the ex ante probability of success from choosing ai = 1 is pie
H
i +(1−
pi)eLi =: ei. We interpret ei as representing the complexity of the task. It is immediate that
the lower ei, the less control the Agent has over success or failure on policy task i.
11 Note
that in this setting there is complementarity between effort and competence in the sense
that the Principal learns more about the competence of the Agent when the Agent exerts
effort than when he does not. Indeed, if the Agent does not exert effort the outcome will be
failure independent of the type of the Agent and will thus be uninformative about the type
of the Agent.
Unless noted otherwise, we assume that the Principal observes the outcome of the
Agent(s)’s actions on each task but not the actions themselves. This assumption is par-
ticularly plausible in the applications of the model to the agency relationship between the
voters and the elected executives, where it is consistent with the standard empirical de-
scriptions of limited knowledge of incumbents’ choices by the voters. In some of the other
applications we noted in the introduction – where the Principal is the head of government
– action observability (transparency) may, perhaps, be more plausible. With those applica-
tions in mind, and to provide a broader institutional analysis of the effects of improving the
Principal’s informational environment, we also consider, where indicated, the possibility of
the actions taken by the Agent being transparent to the Principal.
Upon observing the outcomes o1 and o2, the Principal makes his retention decision(s).
Under bundling, the Principal chooses whether to retain the single Agent, whereas under
unbundling, the Principal chooses whether to retain each Agent Ai separately. If the Princi-
pal dismisses an Agent, then the replacement is of high competence with probability pi. To
summarize, the order of play is as follows:
1. Under bundling the Agent chooses to exert effort or not on each task i, i.e. the Agent
chooses (a1, a2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Under unbundling, each Agent Ai chooses
whether to exert effort on task i, i.e. chooses ai ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Nature chooses the competence θ ∈ {θL, θH} of each Agent and the outcomes oi ∈
{s, f}, i = 1, 2.
3. The Principal observes the outcomes o1 and o2 and subsequently chooses whether to
retain the Agent under bundling and each Agent Ai separately under unbundling.
In Section 4, we study a version of this model in which at the beginning of the game,
the Interest Group can offer the Agent a utility transfer in exchange for a guarantee of
11We discuss our interpretation of task complexity in more detail below.
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policy failure. Focusing our initial analysis on the baseline environment (the environment
without the Interest Group, or, equivalently, one in which the Interest Group’s resources are
commonly known to be too low to afford it a policy influence) allows us to understand the
conceptually simpler agency problem faced by the Principal and how it is affected by the
variation in policy complexity under bundling.
2.2 Payoffs
The Principal prefers success on each task and receives payoff uP (oi = s) > 0 from success
on task i and zero from failure. The Principal receives an additional payoff of R > 0 for each
task i for returning to the office an Agent of high competence. (This additional payoff may
be thought of as the value added to the Principal of having in office a high type, which, in
a more general model may be derived from an explicitly modeled continuation game.) As a
consequence, the Principal only retains an Agent if the Principal believes, upon observing
the policy outcome(s), that this Agent is of type θH with probability superior or equal to
pi.12
Agents value retention and prefer to avoid effort. More specifically: under bundling,
the Agent receives an additional payoff of B > 0 when retained and a payoff of zero when
dismissed from office. Similarly, under unbundling, each Agent Ai receives an additional
payoff of Bi when retained and a payoff of zero when dismissed. In the interest of comparison
and to focus on the institutional effects, we assume throughout that B1 + B2 = B.
13 Let
k > 0 be the cost to the Agent of choosing to exert effort, i.e. ai = 1. The costs are additively
separable, i.e. the Agent incurs cost 2k under bundling when choosing to exert effort on both
tasks, i.e. (a1 = 1, a2 = 1).
14
2.3 Interpretation of Task Complexity
As indicated above, our notion of task complexity is closely connected to related ideas in
the literatures on the political economy of organizations and industrial design (March and
Simon, 1958; Campbell, 1988; Garicano and Wu, 2012).
It is immediate from the definition of ei that low complexity of task i may naturally
correspond to two distinct possibilities:
(a) both eLi and e
H
i are high; or
(b) eHi is high while e
L
i is low, and pi is high.
12Thus, we abstract away from the possibility of primitive heterogeneous valuation of tasks by the Principal,
as in Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2015); the differences in the Principal’s responsiveness to tasks in
our model are induced entirely by the expectations of the Agent(s)’s choices.
13Unless noted otherwise we assume that the pair (B1, B2) is exogenous. We consider the possibility of
the Principal allocating the values of holding office B1 and B2 optimally under unbundling in section 5.1.2.
Endogenizing B1 and B2 does not alter the substance of the comparison between bundling and unbundling.
14In section 5.1.1 we consider the possibility of tasks being complements or substitutes. The general thrust
of the argument goes through in these cases as well.
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Similarly, high complexity of task i naturally corresponds to
(a) both eLi and e
H
i are low; or
(b) eHi is high while e
L
i is low, and pi is low.
These two distinct sets of possibilities correspond to two prominent interpretations of task
complexity in the existing literature. Corresponding to options (a), task complexity may be
thought of a function of “objective task characteristics”: the task is hard for everyone or
easy for everyone, and while the performer’s competence is relevant to success, the outcome
is driven primarily by the features of the task itself. In contrast, the options (b) correspond
to the account of complexity in which the success is, in the first place, a function of the
“interaction between task and person characteristics”; a high complexity task is one in which
the high competence agent may do considerably better than the low competence agent, but
the high competence agents are hard to come by. As an example, consider the tasks facing
the tax collecting agency and the education department in a Western industrialized country
– tasks or policies that are, in a number of jurisdictions assigned to independently elected
officials. A moderately competent head of the tax collecting agency is likely to have a high
probability of success (assuming that success is conventionally measured). In contrast, highly
competent education chiefs have been known to do significantly better than average, but are
notoriously hard to identify.
As a substantive matter, the binary relation of task complexity is, intuitively, complete
when, at a fixed pi, for pair of tasks i, j, both eLi ≤ eLj and eHi ≤ eHj : in such a case, ei ≤ ej.






j is mathematically well-defined, but substantively
hard to interpret, and the task complexity comparison at a fixed pi is hard to motivate. When
interpreting our results, we will have in mind the former, more intuitive, case. With that case
in mind, our formalization of task complexity can be seen as a special case of the stochastic
dominance approach (Garicano and Wu, 2012). Holding fixed pi, and letting eLi ≤ eLj and
eHi ≤ eHj , the distribution of outcomes for the task j first-order stochastically dominates
the distribution of outcomes for the more complex task i. Finally, while our definition of
task complexity allows for indexing pi with respect to the task, we abstract away from that
possibility in our analysis.
3 Analyzing the Baseline Model
As described above, this is a career concerns model of political accountability. We restrict
attention to pure strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria. Before proceeding, note first that
there always exists an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 0), and the
Principal randomizes between retaining and not retaining with any probability. When the
Agent makes such a choice, the outcome, which is always (o1 = f, o2 = f), is completely
uninformative of the Agent’s type, and, correspondingly, the Principal cannot update on her
prior. This equilibrium persists under both bundling and unbundling. As such, it is not
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relevant for evaluating the consequences of institutional variation.15 We focus our analysis
on evaluating the differential effect of the two institutions in incentivizing the Agent(s) to
exert effort.
3.1 Bundling
We begin our analysis of the equilibrium behavior in the baseline model of bundling by
defining distinct retention rules for the Principal that play a central role in our analysis of
the baseline and of the more general model. We will say that the Principal uses the strict
retention rule when he retains the Agent if, and only if, he is successful on both tasks. We
will say that the Principal uses the moderate retention rule when he retains the Agent if,
and only if, he is successful on at least one task. We will also sometimes use the language
of a ith-task retention rule to refer to the rule whereby the Agent is retained if, and only if,
the outcome is success on the ith-task (regardless of the outcome on the other task).
The following proposition specifies parameter values for which the Agent can be incen-
tivized, in equilibrium, to exert effort (1) on both tasks, (2) on only one of the two tasks,
or (3) on neither task. The proposition also specifies the retention behavior that is used in
equilibrium by the Principal to incentivize these effort choices.16
Proposition 1. On the equilibrium path of play under bundling:
1. The Agent chooses to exert effort on both tasks if, and only if, either
(a) the complexity of each task is sufficiently low, ei ≥ 2kejB , and the Principal’s esti-
mation of the Agent’s competence decreases unless the outcome is success on both
tasks, eHi (1− eHj ) ≤ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2; or
(b) the complexity of each task is moderate, 1− k
ejB
≥ ei ≥ k(1−ej)B , and the Principal’s
estimation of the Agent’s competence increases when the outcome is success on at
least one task, eHi (1− eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2.
In case (a), the Principal adopts the strict retention rule, in case (b), the moderate
retention rule.
2. The Agent chooses to exert effort on a single task i when the complexity of that task is
sufficiently low, ei ≥ k/B, and the Principal adopts the ith-task retention rule.
3. The Agent chooses to exert no effort on either task when the complexity of each task
is sufficiently high, ei < k/B for all i = 1, 2, independent of the Principal’s retention
rule.
15It is also fragile, since the off-path events of oi = s are informative of the Agent’s competence, and the
sequentially rational Principal will need to update accordingly.
16A full derivation of equilibrium behavior can be found in the Appendix.
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We illustrate these results in Figure 1 below. This figure represents for given values of the
cost of effort k, and the value of holding office B, the highest level of effort by the Agent that
can be sustained in equilibrium under bundling as a function of the probabilities of success
e1, and e2. In particular, we set B = 1, k = .125. (Recall that e1 and e2 are compound
probabilities, with ei := pie
H
i + (1− pi)eLi for all i = 1, 2. As specified in Proposition 1 above,
additional restrictions on eHi , e
L
i , i = 1, 2, need to be satisfied to sustain an equilibrium in
which the Agent exerts effort on both tasks. Although these restrictions are not depicted in
the figure, we show in the Appendix that, for any value of (e1, e2) ∈ (0, 1)2, there exists an
infinity of eHi , e
L
i , i = 1, 2, and pi that satisfy those restrictions.)















e1 = 1− ke2B
Regions of the figure and the highest equilibrium-consistent
levels of effort at the corresponding pairs of (e1, e2):
(a1 = 1,a2 = 1)
(a1 = 0,a2 = 0)
(a1 = 1,a2 = 0)
(a1 = 0,a2 = 1)
(a1 = 1,a2 = 0) or (a1 = 0,a2 = 1)
Several aspects of this characterization are worthy of particular note. The first is that
while the equilibrium profile that yields the Agent’s investment into effort on both tasks is
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unique for any parameter vector (except on a non-generic set), there are two distinct strate-
gies, each of which is consistent with equilibrium play, that may support that investment –
albeit for different values of the probabilities of success e1 and e2. In the first of these, the
Principal uses the strict retention rule, and in the second, the moderate retention rule.
The moderate retention rule is effective at incentivizing effort on both dimensions when
the probabilities of success e1 and e2 take on intermediate values. Their lower bounds of that
intermediate range are lower than the lower bounds sustaining high effort under the strict
rule. The reason is intuitive: switching to the moderate rule increases the expected utility to
the Agent of trying and sometimes failing: relative to the strict rule, the expected utility of
exerting effort on both tasks increases from e1e2B−2k to (e1e2+e1(1−e2)+(1−e1)e2)B−2k,
while the expected utility of exerting effort only on task i increases from −k to eiB − k.
Consequently, the moderate retention rule can incentivize the Agent to exert effort on both
tasks for probabilities of success which would be too low under the strict retention rule.
However, the moderate rule provides inferior incentives when complexity of at least one
of the tasks drops sufficiently far (i.e., if either e1 or e2 is sufficiently high). Indeed, for the
Agent to best-respond to the moderate retention rule by exerting effort on both tasks rather
than on a single one, it must be the case that (e1e2 +e1(1−e2)+(1−e1)e2)B−2k ≥ eiB−k
for all i = 1, 2, or equivalently ej(1 − ei)B − k ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i. The expression
ej(1 − ei)B − k represents the expected additional benefit of exerting effort on both tasks
rather than on task i alone. If the probability of success ei is very high, ej(1 − ei)B − k
drops below 0, signifying that the Agent can be fairly certain of the successful outcome on
task i, and so of being retained by the Principal independent of the outcome on task j. In
this case, the moderate retention rule cannot incentivize the Agent to exert effort on both
tasks, but a strict rule can. Similarly, to sustain the effort on both tasks with the moderate
rule, the probabilities of success e1 and e2 cannot be too low either, as then ej(1− ei)B − k
is again lower than 0.
For intermediate values of the probabilities of success, then, the moderate retention rule
provides a kind of insurance for the Agent. Exerting effort on task j on top of exerting effort
on task i, gives the Agent a second chance at being retained. When failure on task i is not
unlikely, and the chances of being successful on task j are real, the Agent has incentives to
pay the cost of effort to get this second chance.
Next, note that if Agent type heterogeneity had no effect on the post-election utility of
the Principal, the parameter ranges sustaining the equilibrium investment into both tasks
under the strict and under the moderate incentives would overlap. However, if, as in our
model, the Principal has a preference over the type of Agent in office, this is no longer
the case (except on a non-generic set) because the Principal’s beliefs about the incumbent
that sustain these equilibrium-consistent strategies are, in fact opposite. When the Agent is
expected to invest into effort on both tasks, the strict retention rule is sequentially rational
only if the Principal updates downwards on the competence of the Agent upon observing
failure on any task. In other words, the strict retention rule is sequentially rational only
if the moderate retention rule is not. The converse is also true. The moderate retention
rule is sequentially rational only if the Principal updates positively on the competence of
11
the Agent upon observing success on any task. But then, the strict retention rule is not
sequentially rational. How the Principal should update on the Agent’s type upon observing






2 , and the corresponding
conditions on these values sustaining in equilibrium the strict and the moderate retention
rules, respectively, are formalizing the mutually exclusive posterior updates by the Principal.
Finally, the characterization also points to the presence in our setting of “accountability
traps.”17 If the Principal expects the Agent to exert effort only on task i, the Principal will
consider the outcome on task j to not contain any information about the Agent’s competence.
But then the performance of the Agent on dimension j becomes irrelevant and the Agent
does not have any incentive to signal his competence by exerting effort on task j. Conversely,
if the Principal expects the Agent to exert effort on both tasks, the Principal will consider
the outcomes on both tasks relevant when assessing the competence of the Agent, which
gives the Agent incentives to perform well on both dimensions. The condition under which
the single-effort equilibrium exists, namely ei ≥ B/k, is consistent with the conditions that
need to be satisfied to sustain either one of the two equilibria in which the Agent exerts
effort on both tasks.18 The Principal may, thus, be “trapped” in the equilibrium in which
the Agent exerts effort on only one task, while there exists, for the same parameter values,
an equilibrium in which the Agent exerts effort on both tasks. The welfare consequences
for the Principal of being trapped in the lower-effort equilibrium are unequivocally negative:
both in that the Agent is exerting lower effort, and in that the Principal also learns less
about the competence of the Agent.






2 , and pi for which the Agent exerts effort
in equilibrium, increases in the value of holding office B and decreases in the cost of effort k.
Surprisingly, however, while an increase in the probability of success ei, i = 1, 2, may increase
effort, it may also decrease effort. As we have shown above, the probabilities of success e1
and e2 must be neither too high nor too low to sustain a moderate incentives equilibrium.
Consequently, there are conditions under which an increase in the probability of success ei
breaks the moderate incentives equilibrium, as it leads the Agent to best-respond to the
moderate retention rule by exerting effort only on task i, rather than on both tasks.
So far, we have assumed that the Principal does not observe the effort choices of the
Agent(s). In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to it as the case with “no trans-
parency”. We consider next the implications of having the Principal observe the actions
(a1, a2) chosen by the Agent (“transparency”). As our next result shows, transparency of
actions significantly affects equilibrium behavior under bundling. To state the result com-
17In the sense of Landa (2010) and Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2015).
18As Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,b) show, these accountability traps stem from the comple-
mentarity between competence and effort: the outcome is more informative about the Agent’s competence
the higher the effort. A somewhat different, though related, way of looking at it is suggested by Ashworth,
Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2015), who show that if the noise density relative to the cross-product
of action and type satisfies the strict MLRP, then the necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium
multiplicity is that when the voter expects the agent to take higher action, the agent’s expected probability
of retention is higher. While we do not make the MLRP assumption on the noise density, their necessary
and sufficient condition for multiplicity also holds in our model.
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pactly, let X be the set of all possible vectors x := (eH1 , eL1 , eH2 , eL2 , pi, k, B) and let M ⊂ X
and MT ⊂ X include all such vectors for which there is an equilibrium under bundling
in which the Agent exerts effort on both tasks and the Principal retains the Agent using
the moderate retention rule, under no transparency (M) and under transparency (MT ),
respectively.19
Proposition 2. 1. Given transparency, under bundling:
(a) equilibrium is unique for essentially all parameter values20;
(b) there exists no equilibrium in which the Agent chooses to exert effort on both tasks
and the Principal retains using the strict retention rule.
2. M =MT .
Part 1(a) of this result points to the first significant substantive difference between the
transparency and the no transparency cases: it implies that there are no accountability traps
under transparency (except on a non-generic set). In the no transparency case, multiplicity of
equilibria stems from self-fulfilling behaviors when competence and effort are complements:
if the Principal expects the Agent to exert effort only on task i, the Agent is induced to exert
effort only on task i, which in turn leads the Principal to pay attention only to the outcome
on task i to assess the Agent’s competence. Under transparency, this self-fulfilling prophecy
of the Principal’s expectations about the Agent’s behavior is broken. Independently of the
Principal’s expectations, if the Agent exerts effort only on task j, the Principal, observing
the Agent’s actions, will assess the competence of the Agent only through the outcome on
task j. Transparency essentially gives the Agent, as the first mover, the power to choose
the effort allocation which maximizes his expected utility conditional on the retention rule
this effort allocation induces. Transparency therefore unambiguously improves the Agent’s
welfare.
As an implication, the Agent can profitably deviate from the strict incentives equilibrium.
Under the strict retention rule, the Agent receives an expected payoff of e1e2B − 2k. If the
Agent deviates to exerting effort solely on task i, the Principal, observing these effort choices,
will retain the Agent if, and only if, the outcome oi is success. Consequently, by deviating to
(ai = 1, aj = 0), the Agent increases his expected payoff to eiB − k > e1e2B − 2k. In other
words, transparency of actions makes it impossible for the Principal to enforce the strict
retention rule. To put the consequence in stark terms, transparency makes it impossible to
incentivize the Agent to exert effort on both tasks when the probabilities of success e1 and
e2 are both sufficiently high, i.e. when the agency problem seems ex ante to be the least
problematic!
In sum, transparency of actions (weakly) increases the lower bound of the Principal’s
welfare by ‘killing off’ accountability traps, but (weakly) decreases the upper bound of the
Principal’s welfare by ‘killing off’ the strict incentives equilibrium. Both of these effects of
19We give a precise statement of the conditions that define M and MT in the Appendix.
20More precisely, the set of parameter values for which there is equilibrium multiplicity is non-generic.
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transparency, one positive for the Principal, the other negative, are a consequence of the
multidimensionality of the policy space; as we will see in the analysis of bundling in the
presence of the interest group, transparency will interact with multi-dimensionality of the
policy space there as well, with the effects, some of which are traceable to those we describe
in this section.
With these results in the background, it is, perhaps, particularly interesting that trans-
parency has no effect on the standing of the moderate retention rule equilibrium. Remember
that exerting effort on both tasks is a best-response to the moderate retention rule if, and
only if, (e1e2 + e1(1− e2) + (1− e1)e2)B − 2k ≥ eiB − k ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2. Notice that the
right-hand side of this inequality is the expected utility of deviating to choosing effort solely
on the ith task (and provoking the retention based on the success of the ith task from the
Principal). Thus, when the moderate retention rule is a best-response to observing effort on
both tasks, and exerting effort on both tasks is a best-response to the moderate retention
rule, it is, given the sequential rationality of the Principal, the effort allocation that maxi-
mizes the Agent’s expected utility. Consequently, when the moderate incentives equilibrium
exists, it maximizes the welfare of the Principal and of the Agent. Indeed, the range of
parameter values for which there exists a moderate incentives equilibrium is identical under
transparency of actions and under no transparency.
3.2 Unbundling
If the Principal expects Agent Ai to exert effort with positive probability, then, in equilib-
rium, given that success is a signal of high competence and failure a signal of low competence,
he should retain upon observing success and dismiss upon observing failure. The incentive
effects are maximized with the same rule. The expected payoff to Agent Ai of choosing to
exert effort, is, then, eiBi − k, and so the strategy profile under which Agent Ai chooses
to exert effort and is retained if, and only if, the Principal observes success on task i is
consistent with equilibrium play if, and only if, eiBi − k ≥ 0.
It follows that given values of the cost of effort k and the overall value of holding office
B, there exists a feasible pair (B1, B2) such that both Agents exert effort if, and only if,
e1 ≥ e2ke2B−k . The following figure displays the result graphically:
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Regions of the figure and the highest equilibrium-consistent
levels of effort at the corresponding pairs of (e1, e2):
(a1 = 1,a2 = 1)
(a1 = 0,a2 = 0)
(a1 = 1,a2 = 0)
(a1 = 0,a2 = 1)
(a1 = 1,a2 = 0) or (a1 = 0,a2 = 1)
Note that this equilibrium characterization does not depend on action observability: even
when the Principal observes that the Agent exerted effort, the Principal retains the Agent
if, and only if, the outcome is success as he wants to retain a high competence Agent and,
as before, success is a signal of high competence and failure a signal of low competence.
The incentives that the Principal provides to the Agent Ai are therefore not altered by the
transparency of actions.
3.3 Comparing Institutions
We begin by considering what institution does best with respect to the selection of agents.
We will say that selection is better under the institution I than under the institution I ′ if the
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ex ante (average) probability that the retention results in the selection of the Agent of high
competence under I is higher than it is under I ′. The threats to selection may come from
both the institution, which may fail to generate enough of high quality information about
the Agent(s), and the retention rule used by the Principal, which may create incentives
for the Agent that discourage revelation of information about the Agent’s type or use that
information inefficiently. The following result provides the comparison between bundling
and unbundling with respect to selection:
Proposition 3. 1. If effort is positive and (weakly) higher under bundling, selection is
strictly better under bundling.
2. If effort is higher under unbundling, selection may be better under bundling or un-
bundling, depending on the values of eHi , e
L
i , i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3 implies that both institutions can be optimal, ex ante, in terms of selection.
But it also points to an asymmetry in favor of bundling when the effort level is positive and
equal or higher under bundling. The intuition behind this result is simple. The competence
of the Agent is held constant for each policy task. Therefore, the outcome on task i is
informative about the competence of the Agent on task j 6= i. If, under both institutions,
effort is exerted on task i, but not on task j, the Principal receives information about the
competence, and therefore future performance, of the Agent who exerted effort on task i.
However, because under bundling that Agent is assigned to both tasks, the Principal under
bundling can make better use of that information than the Principal under unbundling,
because in the latter case the Principal receives no information about the Agent Aj 6=i who
is assigned to task j. Similarly, if, under both institutions, effort is exerted on both tasks,
the Principal receives two informative signals about the overall competence of the Agent
under bundling, but only one signal for each Agent Ai under unbundling. In other words,
if the same level of effort is exerted under bundling and under unbundling the resulting
outcome vector is more informative about the overall competence of the office-holder(s)
under bundling than under unbundling. This greater informativeness allows the Principal
to select more competent Agents under bundling, as soon as the effort level is positive and
weakly higher under bundling.
Recall, however, that there is a complementarity between effort and competence in our
model in the sense that each outcome oi is informative about the competence of the Agent,
only if the Agent exerts effort. Hence, when the effort level is strictly higher under unbundling
than under bundling, the institutional comparison generates a tradeoff. Indeed, suppose
both Agents exert effort under unbundling, while the Agent only exerts effort on task j
under bundling (in, for example, jth-task retention rule equilibrium). Then, the Principal
receives two informative signals under unbundling, but only one informative signal oj under
bundling. However, the signal oj is informative about the competence of the Agent on both
policy dimensions under bundling, while each signal oi, i = 1, 2, is only informative about
the competence of Agent Ai on task i under unbundling. Depending on the parameter values
eHi , e
L
i , i = 1, 2, bundling or unbundling may be better at selecting competent Agents.
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We next study under what institution the Principal is able to induce the Agent(s) to
choose higher levels of effort. We start by comparing the conditions under which the Agent(s)
choose to exert effort on task 1, but not on task 2, in equilibrium. Under bundling, there
exists an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses that effort allocation whenever e1 ≥ kB ,
whereas under unbundling Agent A1 chooses to exert effort on task 1 whenever e1 ≥ kB1 .
Thus, for any parameter values e1, k, and B, such that an equilibrium exists in which the
Agent exerts effort only on task 1 under bundling, there exists a feasible pair (B1, B2) for
which such an effort allocation is also sustained in equilibrium under unbundling. A similar
statement holds with respect to the case where effort is only exerted on task 2.
The more interesting, and less straightforward, question concerns the ability to sustain
effort investment into both tasks. To state the result, we define the sets of parameter values
that sustain the distinct types of equilibrium behavioral profiles under bundling. Recall
that we defined M to be the set of all parameter vectors x = (eH1 , eL1 , eH2 , eL2 , pi, k, B) ∈ X
such that there is an equilibrium under bundling in which the Agent exerts effort on both
tasks and the Principal retains using the moderate retention rule. Similarly, define S ⊂ X
as the set of all parameter vectors x ∈ X such that with no action observability by the
Principal, there is an equilibrium under bundling, in which the Agent exerts effort on both
tasks and the Principal retains using the strict retention rule. Finally, let U ⊂ X be the set
of all parameter vectors x such that there exists a feasible allocation (B1, B2) for which in
equilibrium under unbundling, each Agent exerts effort on their respective task i = 1, 2, and
the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is success on her task.21
There, we have the following result:
Proposition 4. Regardless of action transparency,
1. there exists M ⊂M, M 6= ∅, such that M ∩U = ∅ and in equilibrium, effort is exerted
on both tasks under bundling, but not under unbundling, if, and only if, x ∈M ;
2. there exists U ⊂ U , U 6= ∅ such that U ∩M = ∅, U ∩S = ∅, and in equilibrium, effort
is exerted on both tasks under unbundling but not under bundling if, and only if, x ∈ U.
Proposition 4 states that there are parameter values such that effort on both tasks can
be sustained under bundling, but not under unbundling, and vice versa, suggesting distinct
underlying mechanisms and rich incentive dynamics in the relationship between the Princi-
pal and the Agent(s). In particular, part 1 of Proposition 4 states that bundling supersedes
unbundling in terms of incentives only for parameter values under which the moderate re-
tention rule is used in equilibrium under bundling. This has several important implications.
First, the probabilities of success e1 and e2 need to be sufficiently low for bundling to domi-
nate unbundling in terms of incentives. Second, for any parameter values for which a strict
incentives equilibrium holds, there exists a feasible pair (B1, B2) such that effort is exerted
on both tasks under unbundling.
We illustrate some aspects of Proposition 4 in the following figure:
21We give a precise statement of the conditions that define M, S, and U in the Appendix.
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e1 = 1− ke2B
Regions for which (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) can be sustained in equilibrium
under one institution but not the other as a function of (e1, e2):
(a1 = 1,a2 = 1) under unbundling but not under bundling
(a1 = 1,a2 = 1) under bundling but not under unbundling
4 Interest Group Influence
In this section, we consider an expanded model in which the Interest Group is seeking to
influence the policy outcome with respect to the policy dimension relevant to it. In particular,
suppose that, before the Agent responsible for task a1 chooses whether to exert effort, the
Interest Group (abbreviated IG) can offer the Agent a utility transfer, which we will refer
to as “bribe” b ≥ 0, in exchange for no effort on task 1. We follow Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and others in modeling IG’s utility transfer as an action contract with the payment
conditional on a specified, observed, policy decision of the Agent. Thus, if the Agent accepts
the bribe b, he does not exert effort on task 1, i.e. a1 = 0. If, however, the Agent rejects the
bribe he is free to choose a1 = 0 or a1 = 1.
As before, we assume initially that the Principal observes the outcome of the Agent(s)’s
actions on each task but not the actions themselves, thus creating an informational asymme-
try between IG and the Principal. Again, such an asymmetry is natural in the context of the
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agency relationship between the voters and the elected executives, where limited knowledge
of incumbents’ choices by the voters contrasts with the highly professionalized and incen-
tivized information acquisition and decision-making by the interest groups. To assess the
welfare effects of increasing voter’s information and with the other applications in mind, we
will, then, consider the possibility of the actions taken by the Agent being transparent to
the Principal.
The IG has policy preferences opposed to those of the Principal and receives a payoff
of uIG ≥ 0 when the outcome on dimension a1 is failure and a payoff of zero when it is
success.22 Moreover, the Interest Group has disutility −b when paying a bribe b to the
Agent. Throughout, we assume that IG’s resource constraint does not bind and study the
level of the bribe that IG would have to pay to the Agent in order to get the Agent to
implement a1 = 0 and whether, given uIG, IG chooses to pay that bribe to the Agent.
23 We
assume that the value of failure to IG, uIG, is drawn from an arbitrary distribution function
F (·) with full support on R+. We further assume that the Principal knows the distribution
F (·) but not the realization uIG.
4.1 Bundling with Interest Group
We begin with the analysis of how IG affects the level of effort chosen by the Agent in
equilibrium under bundling. Remember that IG prefers failure to success on task 1 and does
not care about task 2. Thus, if in the absence of IG, the Agent chooses not to exert effort on
task 1, IG has no incentive to try to influence the Agent as it already is assured to receive its
preferred outcome. If, on the other hand, the Agent chooses to exert effort on task 1 in the
absence of IG’s influence, IG has an incentive to influence the Agent. To convince the Agent
not to exert effort on task 1 after all, IG needs to offer the Agent a bribe that compensates
the Agent for the expected utility loss of not exerting effort on task 1. The level of this
utility loss depends on the retention rule used by the Principal and the parameter values.
(We provide a characterization of that relationship in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.) IG, in
turn, only offers such a bribe to the Agent if the value of failure, uIG, is sufficiently high to
warrant paying the bribe.
It is straightforward that the bribe that IG needs to pay to contract no effort on task 1 is
increasing in the probability of success e1 and in the value of holding office B, and decreasing
in the cost of effort k. An increase in e1 or in B and a decrease in k raise the expected benefit
to the Agent of exerting effort on task 1. Consequently, the compensation that IG needs to
offer to the Agent not to exert effort on task 1 needs to increase as well.
Somewhat more surprisingly, the level of the bribe may also depend on the probability
of success e2, and, depending on the retention rule used by the Principal, the relationship
22The baseline environment we analyzed in Section 3 is, thus, a special case of this expanded model; in
that special case, uIG = 0, and thus IG does not try to influence policy.
23Note that uIG determines an upper bound on the willingness of IG to pay a bribe to the Agent. To
be sure, IG certainly would not want to pay a bribe b > uIG. As such, introducing an exogenous resource
constraint on the competence of IG to pay a bribe would not alter the thrust of the results nor yield additional
insights.
19
can be either positive or negative. Suppose that in the absence of IG’s influence, the Agent
exerts effort on both tasks in equilibrium. In such a case, the expected benefit to the Agent of
exerting effort on task 1 depends on the probability of success on task 2 and correspondingly
the bribe does too. Under strict incentives, as e2 increases, the expected utility to the Agent
of exerting effort on both tasks increases as well and the compensation needs to increase
correspondingly. Under moderate incentives, however, the level of the bribe is decreasing in
e2. As e2 increases, the expected benefit of exerting effort on task 1 on top of task 2 decreases
because the Agent is less in need of a second chance. Thus, IG can convince the Agent not
to exert effort on task 1 with a smaller bribe. An important implication of this last result
is that there are conditions for which, as the probability of success e2 increases, IG is more
likely to bribe the Agent.
Proposition 13 in the Appendix provides a characterization of the level of effort exerted by
the Agent and the retention rule used by the Principal in equilibrium. This characterization
is a generalization of that in Proposition 1 above. Qualitatively, the two characterizations are
quite similar, with a key exception that the more general one incorporates in the underlying
conditions the value to IG of the policy failure uIG. Rather than restating that result here,
we illustrate it graphically in Figure 4 below and highlight the most important consequences
of the differences in the equilibrium conditions due to the expected interest group activity.
Figure 4 represents for given values of k,B, and uIG, the highest level of effort by the
Agent that can be sustained in equilibrium as a function of the probabilities of success e1,
and e2. In particular, we set B = 1, k = .125, and uIG = .3. (Similar to Figure 1, additional
restrictions on eHi , e
L
i , i = 1, 2, need to be satisfied to sustain an equilibrium in which the
Agent exerts effort on both tasks. Although those restrictions are not depicted in the figure,
for any value of (e1, e2) ∈ (0, 1)2, there exists an infinity of eHi , eLi , i = 1, 2, and pi that satisfy
those restrictions.)
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Figure 4: Highest Level of Effort Sustainable on the Equilibrium Path of Play under Bundling















e1 = 1− ke2B
Regions of the figure and the highest equilibrium-consistent
levels of effort at the corresponding pairs of (e1, e2):
(a1 = 1,a2 = 1)
(a1 = 0,a2 = 0)
(a1 = 1,a2 = 0)
(a1 = 0,a2 = 1)
(a1 = 1,a2 = 0) or (a1 = 0,a2 = 1)
The IG activity influences the effort level chosen by the Agent in distinct ways, some of
which are intuitive and expected, while others much less so. As one might have expected,
IG’s influence decreases the range of probabilities of success e1 and e2 for which in equilibrium
the Agent exerts effort on task 1. This decrease is stronger as the value of failure to IG, uIG,
increases.
Perhaps less expected, IG’s influence can also decrease the level of effort exerted by the
Agent on task 2. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, he is successful
on both tasks and suppose IG convinces the Agent not to exert effort on task 1. Then, the
outcome on task 1 is failure for sure and the Agent will not be retained by the Principal
independent of the outcome on task 2. But then, there are no incentives for the Agent
to exert effort on task 2. This negative spillover effect of IG influence is a direct conse-
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quence of the strict retention rule and points to another reason why strict incentives may be
counterproductive.
Also less expected is the fact that the possibility of IG influence may increase the level
of effort exerted by the Agent. The basic intuition is as follows. Although the Principal
does not observe the effort levels chosen by the Agent, she has expectations over these effort
levels and, in the absence of IG, these expectations are correct in equilibrium. The presence
of IG introduces uncertainty into these expectations: as the Principal does not observe
the realization of the value of failure to IG, uIG, nor the action chosen by the Agent, the
Principal does not know whether the Agent has been captured by IG. This “blurring” of the
expectations about the Agent’s effort affects how the Principal assesses the competence of
the Agent and therefore the Principal’s retention rule. If the Principal expects the Agent to
exert effort on both tasks then failure on task 1 is a signal of low competence, while success
on task 2 is a signal of high competence. If, on the other hand, the Principal expects the
Agent to exert effort on task 2 but is now uncertain as to whether the Agent is exerting effort
on task 1, then observing failure on task 1 conveys a weaker signal about the competence of
the Agent, whereas observing success on task 2 is still a strong signal of high competence.
Thus, the Principal updates more positively upon observing failure on task 1 and success on
task 2 in the presence of IG than in its absence. The effect of the change in this update is
that the Principal will now prefer to use the moderate retention rule instead of the 2nd−task
retention rule, and this change in the retention rule gives the Agent incentives to exert effort
on both tasks instead of on task 2 only. We refer to this effect as the competence cover effect
of IG influence.
To express this idea more precisely, let uˇ(e1, e2) be the value of failure to IG above which






2 , such that, if the
Principal expects the Agent to exert effort on both tasks, the Principal updates negatively
on the competence of the Agent upon observing failure on task 1 and success on task 2,
there exists a probability of capture 1− F (uˇ(e1, e2)) such that, if the Principal expects the
Agent to choose (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) with probability F (uˇ(e1, e2)) and (a1 = 0, a2 = 1) with
probability 1−F (uˇ(e1, e2)), the Principal updates positively on the competence of the Agent
upon observing failure on task 1 and success on task 2. The equilibrium effect, then, is to
create a positive probability of (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) effort profile in equilibrium with the newly
supportable moderate retention rule for the values of the prior probabilities of success that
could not support such a rule or the (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) effort profile without IG.
Finally, recall that X is the set of all vectors x = (eH1 , eL1 , eH2 , eL2 , pi, k, B). Let MIG ⊂ X
be the set vectors x ∈ X such that there exists an equilibrium under bundling in which the
Principal uses the moderate retention rule and, if the value of failure to IG is sufficiently
low, the Agent exerts effort on both tasks.24
The following proposition summarizes the preceding discussion:
Proposition 5. 1. The range of probabilities of success e1 and e2 for which in equilibrium
the Agent exerts effort on task 1 is decreasing in the value to the Interest Group of policy
24We give a precise statement of the conditions that define MIG in the Appendix. Note that, unlike for
M, these conditions will depend on F (uˇ(e1, e2)).
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failure on that task.
2. (negative spillover effect) If the Principal is using the strict retention rule, then
the range of probabilities of success e1 and e2 for which the Agent exerts effort on task
2 is (weakly) decreasing in the value to the Interest Group of policy failure on task 1.
3. (competence cover effect) M⊂MIG.
It is interesting to note that, while the competence cover effect clearly improves the
expected effort, its effects on selection of the next period’s office-holder are ambiguous. It
is straightforward to show that if, in the absence of IG, the equilibrium played for x ∈ X is
the second task equilibrium, but, in its presence, it is the moderate incentives equilibrium,
selection is weakened. However, if in the absence of IG, the equilibrium played is the first
task equilibrium then, whether the selection of the office-holder is improved, may depend on
the probability 1− F (uˇ(e1, e2)) that the Agent is bribed in equilibrium.
Our last element of analysis in this subsection concerns the effects of transparency on
the equilibrium behavior under bundling in the presence of IG. As one might have expected
from the fact that transparency eliminates the strict incentives rule equilibrium in the base-
line environment (Proposition 2), the negative spillover effect, which relies on the Principal
adopting such a rule, disappears under transparency. Of course, whereas the underlying
effect was negative for the Principal’s welfare in the absence of IG, the elimination of the
negative spillover effect has the opposite welfare effect. The Principal’s inability to enforce
the strict retention rule in the presence of transparency may turn out, in the presence of IG,
to be beneficial to her.
However, transparency of actions in the presence of IG also has a different, negative,
implication as well, and this second implication is logically distinct from the implications of
transparency in the baseline environment. Transparency eliminates the competence cover
effect. Recall that the competence cover effect is driven by the fact that the presence of IG
creates uncertainty on the part of the Principal about the actions chosen by the Agent in
equilibrium and thereby alters the way the Principal updates her beliefs about the compe-
tence of the Agent. If the Principal observes the actions chosen by the Agent, the presence
of IG cannot create such uncertainty, and so the competence cover effect cannot occur. The
parameter vectors under which, in the absence of transparency, the presence of IG made
it possible to sustain the equilibrium with the moderate incentives retention rule, in the
presence of transparency can longer sustain such a rule, as the Principal shifts back to the
2nd-task retention rule.
Let MTIG to be the set of parameter vectors x ∈ X such that, with transparency, there
exists an equilibrium under bundling in which the Principal uses the moderate retention rule
and, if the value of failure to IG is sufficiently low, the Agent exerts effort on both tasks.
The following proposition summarizes the preceding arguments.
Proposition 6. 1. Under bundling, transparency eliminates both the negative spillover
effect and the competence cover effect of IG influence. Further:
2. MTIG ⊂MIG.
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The mix of the distinct welfare-enhancing and welfare-diminishing effects of transparency
in the presence of IG adds further dimensions to the picture of the heterogenous welfare
implications of transparency suggested by our analysis of the baseline model. At the most
general level, though, the overall effect of transparency in the presence of IG is consonant
with what we saw in the baseline setting: transparency (weakly) increases the lower bound
of the Principal’s welfare (through the elimination of the negative spillover effect), but also
(weakly) decreases the upper bound of the Principal’s welfare (through the elimination of the
competence cover effect), effectively moderating the realized welfare values in equilibrium.
4.2 Unbundling with Interest Group
In this subsection, we consider the model of unbundling with the Interest Group. Recall
that we are modeling IG as seeking to affect the outcome of the first task. The equilibrium
behavior with respect to the second task is equivalent to that in the baseline model, so we
focus our analysis here on how the presence of IG affects equilibrium behavior on task 1.
As in the baseline model, the expected payoff to Agent Ai of choosing to exert effort, is
eiBi − k. Thus, if e1B1 − k < 0, Agent A1 will choose not to exert effort independent of the
offer from IG, which, therefore, has no incentive to influence A1’s behavior. If, on the other
hand, e1B1−k ≥ 0, A1 exerts effort absent a bribe and IG has an incentive to influence him.
In this case, A1 accepts a bribe if, and only if, it compensates him for the utility loss from
not exerting effort, i.e. if, and only if, b ≥ e1B1 − k. Thus, IG offers bu := e1B1 − k when
the value of task failure to it is sufficiently high and b = 0 otherwise.
Summarizing the discussion above, we have the following characterization:
Proposition 7. For all (ei, Bi, k) such that eiBi − k ≥ 0,
1. the Interest Group offers a bribe bu = e1B1 − k if, and only if, uIG ≥ B1 − k/e1 ≥ 0;
2. Agent A2 chooses to exert effort, and Agent A1 accepts the bribe if, and only if, b ≥
e1B1 − k, and chooses a1 = 0 if accepting and a1 = 1 if rejecting; and
3. the Principal retains Agent Ai if, and only if, the outcome is success on task i.
For all (ei, Bi, k) such that eiBi − k < 0, Agent Ai chooses to exert no effort on task i
independent of the bribe and the Principal’s retention rule.
From the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 7, it follows that given values of
the cost of effort k, the overall value of holding office B, and the value of failure to IG,
uIG, there exists a feasible pair (B1, B2) such that both Agents exert effort if, and only
if, e1 ≥ e2ke2(B−uIG)−k . The graphical representation of the highest level of effort sustainable
in equilibrium under unbundling with Interest Groups is thus very similar to the graphical
representation provided in Figure 2. The only difference is that the range of values for which
effort is exerted on both tasks decreases as the value of e1 above which effort is exerted on
both tasks shifts up from e1 =
e2k




The comparative statics on the equilibrium size of IG bribe and on the conditions under
which the Agent chooses to exert effort are straightforward and intuitive. As the expected
benefit to the Agent of exerting effort increases – either because the probability of success
e1 or the benefit of holding office B1 go up or because the cost of effort k goes down – both
the ex ante likelihood that he does exert it and the bribe that IG needs to pay the Agent
to incentivize him not to do it must increase (in the case of the ex ante likelihood of effort
– weakly) as well. Also intuitively, the Agent is (weakly) less likely to exert effort and IG is
more likely to bribe the Agent as the value uIG that IG assigns to policy failure increases.
4.3 Comparing Institutions: the Effect of IG
We now re-examine the institutional comparison analyzed above in the light of the equilib-
rium effects of IG’s behavior. Our first observation concerns the quality of agent selection.
Proposition 3 on the comparison between bundling and unbundling with respect to selection
goes through in the presence of IG, with the following caveat. As discussed in section 4.1,
the competence cover effect may weaken selection under bundling. As a consequence, there
exists parameter values such that the competence cover effect incentivizes the Agent to exert
effort on both tasks under bundling but weakens selection to the point that it is lower than
under unbundling. Similarly, a result equivalent to Proposition 4 holds as well, but for the
parameter vectors that include the specification of utility to IG of obtaining policy failure
on task 1.
As we now show, an increase in the value of failure to the Interest Group can reverse the
comparison in terms of incentives in each direction with no transparency.
Proposition 8. 1. For all x ∈ S, there exists (B1, B2) such that expected effort is strictly
higher on both tasks under unbundling than under bundling in the presence of IG.
2. For all x ∈M∩ U ,




B, then for any (B1, B2) expected effort is strictly higher on at least
one task under bundling than under unbundling in the presence of IG.




B, there exists (B1, B2) such that expected effort is strictly higher
on task 1 and weakly higher on task 2 under unbundling than under bundling in
the presence of IG.
3. The competence cover effect can shift the comparison of incentives in favor of bundling:
There exist x ∈ X such that x ∈ MIG, yet x 6∈ S ∪ M ∪ U , and x ∈ X such that
x ∈MIG ∩ U , yet x 6∈ S ∪M.
Part 1 of Proposition 8 points once again to the negative aspects of the strict reten-
tion rule. Indeed, consider any vector x ∈ S, that is any vector of parameter values for
which a strict incentives equilibrium can be sustained under bundling in the absence of IG.
Proposition 4 states that, in the absence of IG, there exists (B1, B2) such that effort on
both tasks can be sustained in equilibrium under unbundling for any x ∈ S. In other words,
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for any x ∈ S, there exists (B1, B2) such that expected effort is identical under bundling
and under unbundling in the absence of IG. As we show in the Appendix, in the presence
of IG, however, there exists (B1, B2) such that for any x ∈ S the bribe that IG needs to
pay to the responsible Agent to contract no effort on task 1 is lower under unbundling than
under bundling. Consequently, for any x ∈ S, there exists (B1, B2) such that the responsible
Agent is either (1) bribed under neither institutions (when uIG is sufficiently low), or (2)
bribed under bundling but not under unbundling (when uIG takes on moderate values), or
(3) bribed under both institutions (when uIG is sufficiently high). In other words, for any
such x ∈ S, there exists (B1, B2) such that it is ex ante more likely that the Agent will be
bribed under bundling. Because of the negative spillover effect under strict incentives, this
implies that expected effort is now lower under bundling than under unbundling on both
tasks in the presence of IG.
The situation is significantly different under the moderate retention rule. Consider any
x ∈M∩U , that is any vector of parameter values such that, in the absence of IG, the Agent
can be incentivized to exert effort on both tasks under both institutions, with the Principal
using the moderate retention rule to do so under bundling. As we discussed in subsection
4.1, the level of the bribe is decreasing in e2 under bundling and moderate incentives. As





(B1, B2) such that A2 exerts effort on task 2 and the level of the bribe to contract no effort on
task 1 is higher under unbundling than under bundling. Consequently, there exists (B1, B2)
such that expected effort is strictly higher on task 1 and weakly higher on task 2 under




B, however, then for
any (B1, B2) that sustains effort on task 2 under unbundling the level of the bribe is higher





then for any (B1, B2) expected effort is strictly higher under bundling than under unbundling
on at least one task in the presence of IG.
Finally, part 3 of Proposition 8 states that the competence cover effect can shift the
comparison of incentives in favor of bundling in two ways. First, there exist parameter
vectors x ∈ X , such that effort on both tasks cannot be sustained in equilibrium under
either institution in the absence of IG (that is x 6∈ S ∪M ∪ U), yet, via the competence
cover effect, it can (x ∈ MIG) in the presence of IG. Similarly, there are parameter vectors
x ∈ X , such that in the presence of IG, effort on both tasks can be sustained in equilibrium
under both institutions (that is x ∈ MIG ∩ U), while, in the absence of IG, the Principal
cannot incentivize the Agent to choose (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) under bundling (x 6∈ S ∪M).
Our final analysis in this section concerns the effects of transparency on the comparison
between bundling and unbundling. We have the following result:






2 , pi, k, B, uIG), if, with no transparency, effort
on both tasks can be sustained in equilibrium under unbundling but not under bundling,
then the same is true with transparency.






2 , pi, k, B, uIG), such that, with no transparency, the maximum




Parts (1) and (2) of proposition 9 follow directly from the fact that transparency of
actions decreases the upper bound on the Principal’s welfare under bundling and state that
transparency of actions may reverse the comparison of the highest expected effort between
bundling and unbundling in favor of unbundling but not the other way around. Overall,
transparency of actions then tends to make bundling less attractive as an institution. Part
(3) of proposition 9, however, points to the robust power of the moderate retention rule.
It states the following, in particular. For any parameter vector x ∈ X for which, with
no transparency and in the absence of IG, there exists a moderate incentives equilibrium
in which the Agent exerts effort on both tasks, there also exists such an equilibrium with
transparency and in the presence of IG. Combined with Proposition 4 and the fact that
U = UIG, this implies that there exists a non-empty set of parameter vectors x ∈ X for
which, with transparency and in the presence of IG, effort on both tasks can be sustained
under bundling, but not under unbundling. It moreover implies that for any such parameter
vector, effort on both tasks is sustained via the moderate retention rule under bundling.
The figure below shows the relationship between the different subsets of the set of the
underlying model parameters X described in the paper.
















5.1 Further Considerations of Robustness
5.1.1 Interactions between Tasks
So far we have assumed that the two tasks do not interact. We now establish that our
previous results hold qualitatively as long as the tasks are not strong substitutes; when they
are, unbundling provides better incentives than bundling. To establish these claims, we now
assume that the cost of exerting effort on task i = 1, 2 depends on the effort exerted on task
j 6= i. Formally, we assume that the cost of exerting effort on task i = 1, 2 is k > 0, if no
effort is exerted on task j 6= i, but γk if effort is exerted on task j 6= i. Consequently, under
bundling, the cost of exerting effort on both tasks is now 2γk. We impose the restriction
that exerting effort on both tasks is more costly than exerting effort on a single task, i.e. we
assume 2γk > k, or equivalently γ > 1/2. If γ ∈ (1/2, 1), we say that tasks are complement:
exerting effort on task i = 1, 2 reduces the cost of effort on task j 6= i. If γ > 1, tasks are
substitutes: exerting effort on task i = 1, 2 increases the cost of effort on task j 6= i.









for which bundling generates overall higher effort than unbundling there exists γˆ(k,B, uIG) >
1 such that there exists a non-empty open set for which bundling generates overall higher ef-
fort than unbundling if, and only if, γ < γˆ(k,B, uIG).
Proposition 11. Suppose B > 2k + uIG. Then, if γ ∈ (B−uIG8k + 12 , B−uIG2k ) there exists a
non-empty open set of (e1, e2) such that effort is exerted on both tasks under unbundling but
not under bundling, but there does not exist (e1, e2) such that effort is exerted on both tasks
under bundling but not under unbundling.
5.1.2 Endogenous Allocation of B
So far we have assumed that the values of holding office B1 and B2 are exogenous. It is
instructive to pause and consider what allocations of B to B1 and B2 the Principal would
want to choose, in the presence of IG, if she were able to control those allocations. Supposing
such a control, an ex ante expected utility-maximizing Principal would choose between the
following two allocations: (1) (B1 = B−B2, B2 = k/e2) and (2) (B1 = B,B2 = 0). The first
allocation maximizes the probability that both Agents exert effort in equilibrium. Under this
allocation, the Principal chooses the highest B1, and thus the strongest protection against
the influence of IG, conditional on B2 being just high enough to incentivize Agent 2 to exert
effort. Given that allocation, the level of the bribe that IG pays to Agent 1 in equilibrium
is increasing in the probability of success e2. As e2 increases, B2 = k/e2 decreases and
B1 = B − B2 increases, which strengthens the incentives for Agent 1 to exert effort. IG
must thus offer a higher bribe bu = e1B1 − k to convince the Agent 1 not to exert effort.
Note that under this allocation, the Agent chooses to exert effort on both tasks if, and
only if, e1 ≥ e2ke2(B−uIG)−k . This condition is identical to the one derived in section 4.2, thus
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establishing that the comparison of highest effort, (a1 = 1, a2 = 1), under both institutions
is robust to the endogenous allocation of B.
Under the second allocation, Agent 2 is not incentivized to exert effort as the value of
holding office B2 equals 0. This allocation, however, maximizes the probability that Agent
1 chooses to exert effort as B1 = B reaches its absolute maximum. This may be the utility
maximizing allocation for the Principal when the probability of success e2 is relatively low
and the probability of success e1 is relatively high. When this is the case, incentivizing Agent
1 to exert effort is more valuable to the Principal than incentivizing Agent 2 to exert effort as
Agent 1 is more likely to produce success. The first allocation may then not be optimal as it
makes it rather likely that Agent 1 will be bribed. Indeed, the lowest value of holding office
B2 = k/e2 which incentivizes Agent 2 to exert effort is high when the probability of success
e2 is low. The value of holding office B1 = B−B2 allocated to task 1 is then correspondingly
low, which makes it likely that Agent 1 will be bribed. Note, however, that this allocation
(B1 = B,B2 = 0) does not affect the comparison of bundling versus unbundling, because if
the Principal expects the Agent to exert effort only on task 1 under bundling, the Principal
provides the Agent with the same incentives as the allocation (B1 = B,B2 = 0) provides the
Agents under unbundling.
5.2 Other arguments on unbundling
In this subsection, we highlight the relationship between our model and results and those of
two most closely related papers that concern institutional effects of (un-)bundling: Besley
and Coate (2003) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2015).25
Besley and Coate (2003) consider a citizen-candidate model and show that under bundling
regulatory issues are more likely to be captured by stakeholder interests than under un-
bundling. The specification of our model that is closest to theirs is the case where the
probabilities of success e1 and e2 converge to one on both dimensions, actions are observable
(transparent) and IG seeks to influence policy. In this case, the highest level of effort by
the Agent that can be sustained in equilibrium under bundling is (a1 = 0, a2 = 1). Under
unbundling, however, there exists a range of parameter values under which effort is exerted
on both tasks. Thus, as in the Besley and Coate model, we find that unbundling better pro-
tects the Principal from the influence of interest groups under those conditions. Our analysis
shows, however, that this result, and the broader intuitive argument in favor of unbundling
that it captures, do not generalize as one might have expected. First, even in the case of ac-
tion observability and full policy control, i.e. e1 = e2 → 1, bundling may give the Principal a
higher welfare than unbundling, due to the improved capacity of the Principal to select high
competence Agents under bundling. Indeed, as we show in Section 4.3, there exist conditions
under which the ex ante second period welfare of the Principal is higher under bundling than
under unbundling even when effort is exerted on both tasks under unbundling, but only on
25More distantly related to our analysis is the paper by Ting (2002) who studies the allocation of tasks
to bureaucratic agencies. He studies a pure moral hazard model in a contract-theoretic framework and finds
that bundling supersedes unbundling when the Agency wants to spend less on the various policy fields than
Congress, while unbundling dominates when the Agencies want to spend more.
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a single task under bundling. Second, the intuitive argument in favor of unbundling is not
robust to the Agent’s actions being unobservable. As shown in Section 4.3, when e1 and
e2 are both high, effort may be exerted on both tasks under unbundling as well as under
bundling, yet bundling gives the Principal the power to select better Agents and is therefore
the preferred institution. Finally, our results suggest that the intuitive argument in favor of
unbundling is not robust to the considerations of task complexity. When the probabilities
of success e1 and e2 are moderate, bundling may dominate unbundling due to the power of
moderate incentives.
Our baseline model is related to the model in Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2015)
who also study the welfare effects of policy unbundling. In their analysis, they focus on the
tradeoffs that are generated by a variation in the exogenous correlation in politician com-
petence across tasks and a variation in the differential valuation of each task by voters. In
contrast, we hold these two aspects fixed and focus our analysis on the variations in (a) task
complexity measured by the conditional likelihood of policy success, (b) strength of special
interests, and (c) transparency of policy choices. A second key difference is that, in their
model, Agent’s effort and competence are substitutes while in our model they are comple-
ments.26 These differences, along with the differences between continuity vs. discreteness
of policy outcomes, lead to different results and to fundamentally different mechanisms op-
erating in our models. In the parameter specification of their model that brings it closest
to our baseline environment, they find that bundling strictly dominates unbundling both
in terms of incentives and selection. The intuition is as follows. When the policy outcome
production technology is additive (effort and competence are substitutes), the informative-
ness of a policy outcome about the competence of the Agent does not depend on the level
of effort exerted by the Agent(s). Hence, selection is always better under bundling because
the voters receive two informative signals and, in consequence, their posterior beliefs about
the Agent(s)’s competence put less weight on their prior beliefs under bundling. This gives
the Agent stronger incentives to exert effort in order to try to fool voters into thinking he
is more competent than expected by generating higher policy outcomes. In contrast, we
find that bundling or unbundling may dominate in terms of both incentives and selection.
When tasks are asymmetrically complex, effort may be higher under unbundling and higher
effort improves selection because of the complementarity between effort and competence.
When bundling dominates unbundling in our model, the underlying mechanisms depend on
the level of task complexity. As we explained above, on the range of parameter values that
sustains the moderate incentives equilibrium the mechanism is one of insurance which is
fundamentally distinct from the mechanism in Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014).
26Hatfield and Padro i Miquel (2006) also study the welfare implication of unbundling in a career concerns
model with additive policy outcome production technology. Because their primary source of parameter




Lemma 1 (Best-response of the Principal). 1. If the Principal expects that the Agent chooses
(a1 = 1, a2 = 1) or if the Principal observes that the Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1),
then the Principal retains the Agent upon observing (o1 = s, o2 = s), retains upon
observing (oi = s, oj = f) if, and only if, e
H
i (1− eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, and
does not retain upon observing (o1 = f, o2 = f).
2. If the Principal expects that the Agent chooses (ai = 1, aj = 0) or if the Principal
observes that the Agent chooses (ai = 1, aj = 0), then the Principal retains the Agent
if, and only if, oi = s.
3. If the Principal expects that the Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) or if the Principal
observes that the Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 0), then the Principal is indifferent
between retaining and dismissing the Agent upon observing any of the outcome pairs.
Proof of Lemma 1. We denote (˚a1, a˚2) the Principal’s expectations about the Agent’s ac-
tions when the Principal does not observe the actions (a1, a2) chosen by the Agent. The
Principal’s posterior belief about the Agent’s competence, upon observing outcomes (o1, o2)
and given expectations (˚a1, a˚2), is then denoted Pr(θ = θH |(o1, o2); (˚a1, a˚2)). Similarly,
the Principal’s posterior, upon observing outcomes (o1, o2) and effort choices (a1, a2), is
denoted Pr(θ = θH |(o1, o2); (a1, a2)). Note that we have Pr(θ = θH |(o1, o2); (˚a1, a˚2)) =
Pr(θ = θH |(o1, o2); (a1, a2)) whenever (o1, o2); (˚a1, a˚2) = (o1, o2); (a1, a2). To simplify no-
tation, we thus only look at Pr(θ = θH |(o1, o2); (˚a1, a˚2)) in the sequel of this proof. Re-
member that it is a best response for the Principal to retain the Agent if, and only if,
Pr(θ = θH |(o1, o2); (˚a1, a˚2)) ≥ pi. We have













P r(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 = f); (˚a1 = 1, a˚2 = 1)) = (1− e
H
1 )(1− eH2 )pi
(1− eH1 )(1− eH2 )pi + (1− eL1 )(1− eL2 )(1− pi)
,
and
Pr(θ = θH |(oi = s, oj = f); (˚a1 = 1, a˚2 = 1)) =
eHi (1− eHj )pi
eHi (1− eHj )pi + eLi (1− eLj )(1− pi)
.
Because eHi > e
L
i for all i = 1, 2, we have Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = s, o2 = s); (˚a1 = 1, a˚2 =
1)) = Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = s, o2 = s); (a1 = 1, a2 = 1)) > pi and Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 =
f); (˚a1 = 1, a˚2 = 1)) = Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 = f); (a1 = 1, a2 = 1)) < pi. Consequently,
the Principal’s best response is to retain upon observing (o1 = s, o2 = s), and to dismiss
upon observing (o1 = f, o2 = f). In turn, Pr(θ = θH |(oi = s, oj = f); (˚a1 = 1, a˚2 = 1)) =
Pr(θ = θH |(oi = s, oj = f); (a1 = 1, a2 = 1)) ≥ pi if, and only if, eHi (1 − eHj ) ≥ eLi (1 − eLj ).
Consequently, the Principal’s best response is to retain upon observing (oi = s, oj = f) if,
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and only if, eHi (1− eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj ). Similarly, we have
Pr(θ = θH |(oi = s, oj = f); (˚ai = 1, a˚j = 0)) = e
H
i pi





Pr(θ = θH |(oi = f, oj = f); (˚ai = 1, a˚j = 0)) = (1− e
H
i )pi
(1− eHi )pi + (1− eLi )(1− pi)
.
Because eHi > e
L
i for all i = 1, 2, we have Pr(θ = θH |(oi = s, oj = f); (˚ai = 1, a˚j = 0)) =
Pr(θ = θH |(oi = s, oj = f); (ai = 1, aj = 0)) > pi and Pr(θ = θH |(oi = f, oj = f); (˚ai =
1, a˚j = 0)) = Pr(θ = θH |(oi = f, oj = f); (ai = 1, aj = 0)) < pi. Consequently the Principal’s
best response is to retain upon observing (oi = s, oj = f), and to dismiss upon observing
(oi = f, oj = f). Outcomes (oi = s, oj = s) and (oi = f, oj = s) are off the equilibrium path
in this case and any retention decision is a best response.
Finally,
Pr(θ = θH |(oi = f, oj = f); (˚ai = 0, a˚j = 0)) = pi.
Outcomes (oi = s, oj = s) and (oi = f, oj = s) are off the equilibrium path in this case and
any retention decision is a best response.
Lemma 2. 1. If the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, (o1 = s, o2 = s), then the
Agent’s best response is to choose (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if e1e2B − 2k ≥ 0 and to choose
(a1 = 0, a2 = 0) if e1e2B − 2k ≤ 0.
2. If the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, oi = s for at least some i = 1, 2, then
the Agent’s best response is to choose (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if ei(1 − ej)B − k ≥ 0 for all
i = 1, 2, to choose (ai = 1, aj = 0) if [0 ≥ ej(1− ei)B − k, ei ≥ ej and eiB − k ≥ 0],
and to choose (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) if eiB − k ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2.
3. If the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, oi = s for specific i = 1, 2, then
the Agent’s best response is to choose (ai = 1, aj = 0) if eiB − k ≥ 0, and to choose
(ai = 0, aj = 0) if eiB − k ≤ 0.
4. If the Principal always or never retains the Agent, then the Agent’s best response is to
choose (a1 = 0, a2 = 0).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose first that the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, (o1 =
s, o2 = s). Let us denote this retention rule by rs. Then
UA((a1 = 1, a2 = 1), rs) = e1e2B − 2k
UA((ai = 1, aj = 0), rs) = −k
UA((a1 = 0, a2 = 0), rs) = 0.
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Choosing (ai = 1, aj = 0) is never a best response because −k < 0. Hence, choosing (a1 =
1, a2 = 1) is the Agent’s best response to the strict retention rule if, and only if, e1e2B−2k ≥
0, while choosing (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) is the Agent’s best response if, and only if, e1e2B−2k ≤ 0.
Suppose now that the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, oi = s for at least some
i = 1, 2. Let us denote this retention rule by rm. Then
UA((a1 = 1, a2 = 1), rm) = (e1e2 + e1(1− e2) + (1− e1)e2)B − 2k
UA((a1 = 1, aj = 0), rm) = e1B − k
UA((a1 = 0, a2 = 1), rm) = e2B − k
UA((a1 = 0, a2 = 0), rm) = 0.
Hence, choosing (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) is the Agent’s best response to the moderate retention rule
if, and only if, the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) (e1e2+e1(1−e2)+(1−e1)e2)B−
2k ≥ eiB − k for all i = 1, 2, and (2) (e1e2 + e1(1− e2) + (1− e1)e2)B − 2k ≥ 0. Condition
(1), in turn, is satisfied if, and only if, [e1(1− e2)B − k ≥ 0, and (1− e1)e2B − k ≥ 0] which
implies condition (2). Choosing (ai = 1, aj = 0) is the Agent’s best response if the following
three conditions hold: (1) eiB−k ≥ 0, (2) eiB−k ≥ ejB−k, and (3) eiB−k ≥ (e1e2+e1(1−
e2)+(1−e1)e2)B−2k which is equivalent to [0 ≥ ej(1− ei)B − k, ei ≥ ej and eiB − k ≥ 0] .
Finally, choosing (ai = 0, aj = 0) is the Agent’s best response if the following two conditions
hold: (1) 0 ≥ eiB − k for all i = 1, 2, and (2) 0 ≥ (e1e2 + e1(1 − e2) + (1 − e1)e2)B − 2k.
Because (1) implies (2), this is equivalent to eiB − k ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2.
Suppose next that the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, oi = s for a specific
i = 1, 2. Denote this retention rule by ri. Then
UA((a1 = 1, a2 = 1), ri) = eiB − 2k
UA((ai = 1, aj = 0), ri) = eiB − k
UA((ai = 0, aj = 1), ri) = −k
UA((a1 = 0, a2 = 0), ri) = 0.
Hence, choosing (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) is never a best-response to the i
th-task retention rule
because eiB − 2k < eiB − k. Similarly, (ai = 0, aj = 1) is never a best response because
−k < 0. Choosing (ai = 1, aj = 0) is thus the Agent’s best response to the ith-task retention
rule if, and only if, eiB − k ≥ 0, while choosing (ai = 0, aj = 0) is the Agent’s best response
if, and only if, eiB − k ≤ 0.
If the Principal never retains (or always retains), then UA(a1 = 1, a2 = 1) < UA(ai =
1, aj = 0) < UA(a1 = 0, a2 = 0) and the Agent’s best response is to choose (a1 = 0, a2 = 0).
Looking for mutual best responses yields the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1. Follows from Lemmata 1 and 2 by looking for mutual best responses.
Corollary 1. From Proposition 1, we can formally define M and S. We have, M = {x ∈
X |1 − k
ejB




, eHi (1− eHj ) ≤ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2}.
Proposition 12. On the equilibrium path of play under bundling with transparency of ac-
tions:
1. The Agent chooses to exert effort on both tasks if, and only if, the complexity of each
task is moderate, 1− k
ejB
≥ ei ≥ k(1−ej)B , and the Principal’s estimation of the Agent’s
competence increases when the outcome is success on at least one task, eHi (1 − eHj ) ≥
eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2.
2. The Agent chooses to exert effort only on task i if, and only if, all of the following
three conditions hold: (1) the complexity of that task is sufficiently low, ei ≥ k/B, (2)
it is (weakly) lower than the complexity of task j 6= i, ei ≥ ej, and (3) the conditions to
sustain an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses to exert effort on both tasks (stated
in part 1) are not satisfied.
3. The Agent chooses to exert no effort on either task if, and only if, the complexity of
each task is sufficiently high: ei ≤ k/B for all i = 1, 2.
Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose the Agent chooses (ai = 1, aj = 0). By Lemma 1, the
Principal then retains the Agent if, and only if, oi = s. Consequently, the Agent’s expected
utility from choosing (ai = 1, aj = 0) is eiB − k.
Suppose next the Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1). By Lemma 1, the Principal then uses
one of the following three retention rules:
1. If eHi (1 − eHj ) < eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, the Principal retains if, and only if (o1 =
s, o2 = s).
2. If eHi (1 − eHj ) > eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, the Principal retains if, and only if oi = s
for at least some task i = 1, 2.
3. If eHi (1 − eHj ) > eLi (1 − eLj ) for i = 1, 2, and eHj (1 − eHi ) < eLj (1 − eLi ) for j 6= i, the
Principal retains if, and only if oi = s for i = 1, 2.
In case 1. the Agent’s expected utility from choosing (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) is e1e2B − 2k. In case
2. the Agent’s expected utility from choosing (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) is (e1 + e2 − e1e2)B − 2k.
In case 3. the Agent’s expected utility from choosing (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) is eiB − 2k. Finally
choosing (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) induces, by Lemma 1 again, the Principal to dismiss the Agent
who then receives a payoff of 0.
The Principal then chooses the effort allocation (a1, a2) which maximizes his expected
utility given the retention rule that is induced by (a1, a2). Because e1e2B − 2k < eiB − k
and eiB− 2k < eiB− k for all i = 1, 2, the Agent never chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if it induces
retention rule 1. or 3. The Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if, and only if, (a1 = 1, a2 = 1)
induces retention rule 2. and (e1 + e2 − e1e2)B − 2k ≥ eiB − k ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, which is
equivalent to ei(1− ej)B − k ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2. The Agent chooses (ai = 1, aj = 0) if, and
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only if, one of the two following sets of conditions hold; (1) (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) induces retention
rule 2. and eiB−k ≥ max{ejB−k, (e1+e2−e1e2)B−2k, 0}, or (2) (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) does not
induce retention rule 2. and eiB− k ≥ max{ejB− k, 0}. The Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 0)
if, and only if, 0 > eiB − k for all i = 1, 2. Note that 0 > eiB − k for all i = 1, 2, implies
0 > (e1 + e2 − e1e2)B − 2k.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1 follows directly from Proposition 12.
By Part 1 (b) of Proposition 1, we haveM = {x ∈ X |1− k
ejB
≥ ei ≥ k(1−ej)B , eHi (1−eHj ) ≥
eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i = 1, 2} Similarly, by Part 1 of Proposition 12, we have MT = {x ∈
X |1− k
ejB
≥ ei ≥ k(1−ej)B , eHi (1− eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2}. Hence, M =MT .
Proposition 3. Denote by UUP (a1, a2) the ex ante second period welfare of the Principal under
unbundling when (a1, a2) is exerted in equilibrium. We have





eHi R + (1− eHi )piR
]
+ (1− pi)(1− eLi )piR
UUP (ai = 1, aj = 0) = pi
[
eHi R + (1− eHi )piR
]
+ (1− pi)(1− eLi )piR + piR
UUP (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) = 2piR.
Simple algebra establishes that UUP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) > U
U
P (ai = 1, aj = 0) > U
U
P (a1 = 0, a2 =
0).
Similarly, denote UBP ((a1, a2), r) the ex ante second period welfare of the Principal under
bundling when (a1, a2) is exerted by the Agent and the Principal uses retention rule r.
We have




2 2R + (1− eH1 eH2 )pi2R
]
+ (1− pi)(1− eL1 eL2 )pi2R




2 − eH1 eH2 )2R + (1− eH1 )(1− eH2 )pi2R
]
+ (1− pi)(1− eL1 )(1− eL2 )pi2R
UBP (ai = 1, aj = 0, ri) = pi
[
eHi 2R + (1− eHi )pi2R
]
+ (1− pi)(1− eLi )pi2R
UUP (a1 = 0, a2 = 0, r) = 2piR.
Simple algebra establishes (1) that UBP (ai = 1, aj = 0, ri) > U
B
P (a1 = 0, a2 = 0, r), (2)
that UBP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1, rm) > U
B
P (ai = 1, aj = 0, ri) when e
H
i (1 − eHj ) ≥ eLi (1 − eLj ) for
all i = 1, 2, j 6= i, and (3) that UBP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1, rs) > UBP (ai = 1, aj = 0, ri) when
eHi (1− eHj ) ≤ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Some more algebra then establishes (1) that UBP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1, rm) > U
U
P (a1 = 1, a2 = 1)
when eHi (1 − eHj ) ≥ eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i, (2) UBP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1, rs) > UUP (a1 =
1, a2 = 1) when e
H
i (1− eHj ) ≤ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i, and (3) that UBP (ai = 1, aj =
0, ri) > U
U
P (ai = 1, aj = 0), which, combined with U
U
P (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) > U
U
P (ai = 1, aj =
0) > UUP (a1 = 0, a2 = 0), establishes Part 1 of Proposition 3.
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Finally, we have (1) UUP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) > U
B
P (ai = 1, aj = 0, ri) if, and only if,
eHi − eLi < eHj − eLj , (2) UUP (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) > UBP (a1 = 0, a2 = 0, r), and (3) UUP (ai = 1, aj =
0) > UBP (a1 = 0, a2 = 0, r) = U
U
P (a1 = 0, a2 = 0), which establishes Part 2 of Proposition
3.
Proof of Proposition 4. Proving Proposition 4 is equivalent to proving the following two
statements:
1. Effort on both tasks can be sustained in equilibrium under bundling, but not under
unbundling, if, and only if, for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i, (1) k
(1−ej)B ≤ ei ≤ min{ 2kejB , 1− kejB},
and (2) eHi (1− eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj ). There exists an infinity of vectors (eH1 , eL1 , eH2 , eL2 , pi)
that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) if, and only if, B > 4k.
2. If 4k ≥ B > 2k, then effort on both tasks can be sustained in equilibrium under
unbundling, but not under bundling, if 2k
e2B
> e1 ≥ e2ke2B−k . If B > 4k, then effort on
both tasks can be sustained in equilibrium under unbundling, but not under bundling,
if 2k
e2B
> e1 ≥ e2ke2B−k and if e1 6∈
[
k
(1−e2)B , 1− ke2B
]
.
We first establish that for all parameter values such that there exists a strict incentives
equilibrium under bundling, there exists a feasible pair (B1, B2) such that both Agents exert
effort under unbundling. Consequently, for any x ∈ X such that, in equilibrium, effort is
exerted on both tasks under bundling, yet not under unbundling, it must be the case that the
Principal uses the moderate retention rule. If the Principal uses the strict retention rule, the
Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if, and only if, e1e2B − 2k ≥ 0 or equivalently 1 ≥ e1 ≥ 2ke2B .
Similarly, there exists (B1, B2) such that both Agents exert effort under unbundling if, and
only if, 1 ≥ e1 ≥ e2ke2B−k . We now prove that for all (e1, e2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 , if 1 ≥ e1 ≥ 2ke2B then
1 ≥ e1 ≥ e2ke2B−k . Note first that if 0 ≤ e2 < 2kB , then 2ke2B > 1 and there is no value of e1 that
satisfies 1 ≥ e1 ≥ 2ke2B . Similarly, if 0 < B < 2k there is no (e1, e2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 that satisfies
1 ≥ e1 ≥ 2ke2B . We have e2ke2B−k < 2ke2B if, and only if, Q(e2) := e22B−2e2B+2k < 0. If e2 = 2kB ,
then Q(e2) ≤ 0 whenever B ≥ 2k. Moreover, dQde2 = 2e2B − 2B < 0 for all e2 ∈ [0, 1) . Hence,
e2k






, which establishes the claim.







for which (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) can be sustained in equilibrium under bundling, but not under
unbundling. Let eu be the intersection between e1 =
e2k




Note that eu < 1 as B > 4k. For the rest of the paragraph we restrict attention to values
of (e1, e2) such that e1 = e2. Abusing notation slightly, we work with e = e1 = e2. For any
e < eu, effort is exerted on at most one task under unbundling because we have e < ek
eB−k
whenever e < eu. We now derive the set of values of e that satisfy e(1 − e)B − k ≥ 0. We












:= em. If B > 4k, em
and em are well-defined and 0 ≤ em < 1/2 < em ≤ 1. Moreover, e(1 − e)B − k reaches its
maximum at e = 1/2 and is strictly increasing on [0, 1/2) and strictly decreasing on (1/2, 1] .
Thus, for all e ∈ [em, em] , we have e(1 − e)B − k ≥ 0. Simple algebra shows that em < eu
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if B > 4k. It follows that for all e ∈ [em, eu) , (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) cannot be sustained under
unbundling, but can be sustained under bundling, provided the Principal uses the moderate
retention rule.
In equilibrium, the Principal uses the moderate retention rule if, and only if, eHi (1−eHj ) ≥
eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. We now show that for any (e1, e2) ∈ (0, 1)2 there exists






2 , pi) such that ei = pie
H
i + (1− pi)eLi and eHi (1− eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj )
for all i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Suppose first e1 = e2 ∈ (0, 1). Note that for any eH1 , eL1 , eH2 , eL2
such that (1) eH1 = e
H




2 , (3) e
L
1 < e1 < e
H
1 , and (4) |eH1 − 1/2| ≤ |eL1 − 1/2|,
we have eHi (1 − eHj ) ≥ eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. It is easy to see that there










Because eHi > ei > e
L
i , we have pi ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, some simple algebra establishes that
ei = pie
H
i + (1 − pi)eLi . WLOG suppose next that 1 > e1 > e2 > 0. Some simple algebra
establishes that eHi (1− eHj ) > eLi (1− eLj ) for all i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i if, and only if eH1 < 1− eL2






1 > e1. It is easy to see that there is an infinity of e
H
1 ’s and e
L
2 ’s that satisfy




) ⊂ (0, 1) close enough to e1
eH1
. By











. By this definition of eL1 and e
H
2 , we have ei = pie
H
i + (1 − pi)eLi for
all i = 1, 2. Moreover, because pi < e1
eH1




1 > eH2 . Finally, we have e
H





1−pi , if, and only if,
f(pi) := pi2(1−eL2 −eH1 )+pi(−1−e2+2eL1 +e1)+e2−eL2 < 0. As eH1 < 1, which by assumption
is lower than e1
e2
, some simple algebra shows that f( e1
eH1
) < 0. As f(pi) is a continuous function
of pi, we have f(pi) < 0 for any value of pi close enough to e1
eH1
, which establishes the result.




(1−e2)B , 1− ke2B
]















. Because B > 4k, we have k
(1−e2)B =
k









, then any e1 ∈ (1/2, 1) satisfies the required conditions. Moreover, it is easy to
see that around any (e1, e2) such that e1 ∈ (1/2, 1) and e2 = 2kB there is an open ball that
satisfies the required conditions.
Lemma 3. Under bundling:
1. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is success on task 1 and
assume that e1B−k ≥ 0. Then, the Interest Group offers the Agent a bribe b = e1B−k
if, and only if, uIG ≥ B − k/e1.
2. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is success on both tasks
and assume that e1e2B − 2k ≥ 0. Then, the Interest Group offers the Agent a bribe
b = e1e2B − 2k if, and only if, uIG ≥ e2B − 2k/e1.
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3. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is success on at least one
task and assume that ei(1−ej)B−k ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2. Then, the Interest Group offers
the Agent a bribe b = e1(1−e2)B−k if, and only if, uIG ≥ (1−e2)B−k/e1 =: uˇ(e1, e2).
Proof of lemma 3. 1. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is
success on task 1 and assume that e1B − k ≥ 0. Then, if IG does not offer a bribe,
the Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 0). The Agent’s expected utility is then e1B − k.
If IG offers the Agent a bribe b and the Agent accepts the bribe, the Agent chooses
(a1 = 0, a2 = 0) and receives an expected utility of b. It follows that the Agent accepts
the bribe b if, and only if, b ≥ e1B − k. IG thus chooses between the lowest bribe that
the Agent accepts, i.e. b = e1B − k and b = 0. Upon offering b = e1B − k, IG receives
a payoff of uIG − b = uIG − (e1B − k). Upon offering b = 0, IG receives a payoff of
(1− e1)uIG. Hence, IG offers b = e1B − k if, and only if, uIG ≥ B − k/e1.
2. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is success on both tasks
and assume that e1e2B− 2k ≥ 0. Then, if IG does not offer a bribe, the Agent chooses
(a1 = 1, a2 = 1). The Agent’s expected utility is then e1e2B − 2k. If IG offers the
Agent a bribe b and the Agent accepts the bribe, the Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 0)
and receives an expected utility of b. It follows that the Agent accepts the bribe b if,
and only if, b ≥ e1e2B − 2k. IG thus chooses between the lowest bribe that the Agent
accepts, i.e. b = e1e2B − 2k and b = 0. Upon offering b = e1e2B − 2k, IG receives a
payoff of uIG − b = uIG − (e1e2B − 2k). Upon offering b = 0, IG receives a payoff of
(1− e1)uIG. Hence, IG offers b = e1e2B − 2k if, and only if, uIG ≥ e2B − 2k/e1.
3. Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, there is success on at least one
task and assume that ei(1 − ej)B − k ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i. Then, if IG does not
offer a bribe, the Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1). The Agent’s expected utility is then
(e1e2+e1(1−e2)+(1−e1)e2)B−2k. Note that e2(1−e1)B−k ≥ 0 implies e2B−k ≥ 0.
Hence, if IG offers the Agent a bribe b and the Agent accepts the bribe, the Agent
chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 1) and receives an expected utility of b+e2B−k. It follows that the
Agent accepts the bribe b if, and only if, b+e2B−k ≥ (e1e2+e1(1−e2)+(1−e1)e2)B−2k,
i.e. if, and only if, b ≥ e1(1− e2)B − k. IG thus chooses between the lowest bribe that
the Agent accepts, i.e. b = e1(1−e2)B−k and b = 0. Upon offering b = e1(1−e2)B−k,
IG receives a payoff of uIG − b = uIG − (e1(1 − e2)B − k). Upon offering b = 0, IG
receives a payoff of (1 − e1)uIG. Hence, IG offers b = e1(1 − e2)B − k if, and only if,
uIG ≥ (1− e2)B − k/e1.
Proposition 13. On the equilibrium path of play under bundling with IG:
1. The Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if, and only if, either
(a) the complexity of each task, as well as the value of failure to IG, are sufficiently low,
e1 ≥ 2ke2B−uIG and the Principal’s estimation of the Agent’s competence decreases
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unless the outcome is success on both tasks, eHi (1 − eHj ) ≤ eLi (1 − eLj ) for all
i = 1, 2, j 6= i; or
(b) the complexity of each task is moderate and the value of failure to IG is sufficiently
low, 1 − k
e2B
≥ ei ≥ k(1−e2)B−uIG , and the Principal’s estimation of the Agent’s
competence increases when the outcome is success on at least one task, eH1 (1 −
eH2 ) ≥ eL1 (1− eL2 ), and eH2 (1− eH1 F (uˇ(e1, e2))) ≥ eL2 (1− eL1F (uˇ(e1, e2))).
In case (a), the Principal adopts the strict retention rule, in case (b), the moderate
retention rule.
2. The Agent chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 0) when the complexity on task 1, as well as the value
of failure to IG, are sufficiently low, e1 ≥ k/(B − uIG), and the Principal adopts the
1th-task retention rule.
3. The Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 1) when the complexity on task 2 is sufficiently low,
e2 > k/B, and the Principal retains if (o1 = f, o2 = s) and dismisses if (o1 = f, o2 = f).
4. The Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) if




e2B−uIG and the Principal adopts the strict retention rule (which requires
eHi (1− eHj ) ≤ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2).
Proof of Proposition 13. 1. From Proposition 1 we know that the Agent chooses to exert
effort on both tasks if, and only if, the Principal uses either the strict retention rule or
the moderate retention rule.
(a) Suppose the Principal uses the strict retention rule. The Agent then chooses to
exert effort on both tasks if, and only if, e1e2B − 2k ≥ 0 and IG did not bribe
the Agent. From Lemma 3, IG, in turn, does not bribe the Agent if, and only
if, uIG ≤ e2B − 2k/e1 which is equivalent to e1 ≥ 2ke2B−uIG ≥ 2ke2B . The conditions
under which it is sequentially rational for the Principal to use the strict retention
rule are not altered by the possibility of IG influence. The derivation is similar to
the one found in the proof of Lemma 1.
(b) Suppose the Principal uses the moderate retention rule. The Agent then chooses
to exert effort on both tasks if, and only if, 1− k
e2B
≥ e1 ≥ k(1−e2)B , and IG did not
bribe the Agent. From Lemma 3, IG, in turn, does not bribe the Agent if, and only
if, uIG ≤ (1 − e2)B − k/e1 = uˇ(e1, e2) which is equivalent to e1 ≥ k(1−e2)B−uIG ≥
k
(1−e2)B . When IG bribes the Agent, the Agent chooses (a1 = 0, a2 = 1) if, and
only if, e2B − k ≥ 0. Note that 1− ke2B ≥ e1 ≥ k(1−e2)B implies e2B − k ≥ 0.
We now derive the conditions under which it is sequentially rational for the Prin-
cipal to use the moderate retention rule given that the Principal believes that the
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Agent and IG are best-responding to such a retention strategy. To understand
the construction of the beliefs, remember that the Principal is uncertain about
the value uIG that IG attaches to policy failure and that uIG is drawn from a
distribution function F (·) with full support on the non-negative real line R+. It
follows that the Principal expects the following action profile: with probability
F (uˇ(e1, e2)) ∈ (0, 1) IG does not to bribe the Agent who chooses (a1 = 1, a2 = 1),
while with probability (1 − F (uˇ(e1, e2))) IG bribes the Agent who then chooses
(a1 = 0, a2 = 1). We denote (˚a
F
1 , a˚2 = 1) these expectations of the Principal about
the Agent’s actions. We thus have






F (uˇ(e1, e2))eH1 e
H






Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 = f); (˚aF1 , a˚2 = 1))
=
[
(1− eH2 )(1− eH1 F (uˇ(e1, e2)))
]
pi[




(1− eL2 )(1− eL1 F (uˇ(e1, e2)))
]
(1− pi) ,




1 (1− eH2 )pi
F (uˇ(e1, e2))eH1 (1− eH2 )pi + F (uˇ(e1, e2))eL1 (1− eL2 )pi
,
Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 = s); (˚aF1 , a˚2 = 1))
=
[
eH2 − F (uˇ(e1, e2))eH1 eH2
]
pi[




eL2 − F (uˇ(e1, e2))eL1 eL2
]
(1− pi) .
As in the baseline model, the Principal updates favorably on the type of the Agent
upon observing success on both tasks, and negatively upon observing failure on
both tasks. Indeed, we have Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = s, o2 = s); (˚aF1 , a˚2 = 1)) > pi and
Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 = f); (˚aF1 , a˚2 = 1)) < pi, because eHi > eLi for all i = 1, 2.
But, the conditions under which the Principal updates favorably upon observing
success on one task and failure on another differ from those of the baseline model.
While, as in the baseline model, Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = s, o2 = f); (˚aF1 , a˚2 = 1)) ≥ pi if,
and only if, eH1 (1−eH2 ) ≥ eL1 (1−eL2 ), we have Pr(θ = θH |(o1 = f, o2 = s); (˚aF1 , a˚2 =
1)) ≥ pi if, and only if, eH2 (1− eH1 F (uˇ(e1, e2))) ≥ eL1 (1− eL2F (uˇ(e1, e2))).
2. Suppose the Principal retains if, and only if, o1 = s. The Agent then chooses (a1 =
1, a2 = 0) if, and only if, e1B − k ≥ 0 and IG did not bribe the Agent. From Lemma
3, IG, in turn, does not bribe the Agent if, and only if, uIG ≤ B − k/e1 which is
equivalent to e1 ≥ kB−uIG ≥ kB . The conditions under which it is sequentially rational
for the Principal to choose to retain if, and only if, o1 = s are not altered by the
possibility of IG influence. The derivation is similar to the one found in the proof of
Lemma 1.
3. Follows directly from Lemmata 1 and 2.
4. (a) Follows directly from Lemmata 1 and 2 and the previous steps in the present
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proof.
(b) Suppose the Principal retains the Agent if, and only if, (o1 = s, o2 = s), which
requires eHi (1− eHj ) ≤ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, and suppose that e1 < 2ke2B−uIG .
Then IG bribes the Agent who, consequently, does not exert effort on task 1. But
then, as the Principal retains if, and only if, (o1 = s, o2 = s), the expected utility
to the Agent of exerting effort on task 2 is −k. Hence, the Agent does not exert
any effort at all.




1 (1− eH2 ) ≥ eL1 (1− eL2 ), eH2 (1− eH1 F (uˇ(e1, e2))) ≥ eL2 (1− eL1F (uˇ(e1, e2)))}.
Proof of Proposition 5. 1. Follows directly from Propositions 1 and 13.
2. Follows directly from Propositions 1 and 13.
3. Remember that from corollary 1, we haveM = {x ∈ X |1− k
ejB
≥ ei ≥ k(1−ej)B , eHi (1−
eHj ) ≥ eLi (1− eLj ) for all i = 1, 2}. From corollary 2, we haveMIG = {x ∈ X |1− ke2B ≥
ei ≥ k(1−e2)B , eH1 (1−eH2 ) ≥ eL1 (1−eL2 ), eH2 (1−eH1 F (uˇ(e1, e2))) ≥ eL2 (1−eL1F (uˇ(e1, e2)))}.
It is easy to see that, because F (uˇ(e1, e2)) ∈ (0, 1) for all (e1, e2), eH2 (1−eH1 ) ≥ eL2 (1−eL1 )
implies eH2 (1 − eH1 F (uˇ(e1, e2))) > eL2 (1 − eL1F (uˇ(e1, e2))). The other conditions in the
definition of M and MIG are identical. Hence, if x ∈ M then x ∈ MIG and M ⊆
MIG.
Proof of Proposition 6. 1. Follows directly from arguments given in the text.
2. We first derive MTIG. By Lemma 2 exerting effort on both tasks is a best response to
the moderate retention rule if, and only if, 1 − k
e2B
≥ e1 ≥ k(1−e2)B . Note also that for
any (e1, e2) such that this last condition is satisfied there exists uˇIG(e1, e2) ≥ 0 such
that for all uIG ≤ uˇIG(e1, e2) IG does not bribe the Agent. Moreover, by Lemma 1,
the Principal uses the moderate retention rule upon observing (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) if, and
only if, eHi (1 − eHj ) ≥ eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i. It follows that MTIG = {x ∈
X |1 − k
ejB
≥ ei ≥ k(1−ej)B , eHi (1 − eHj ) ≥ eLi (1 − eLj ) for all i = 1, 2, j 6= i}. Hence,
following the steps in the proof of Proposition 5, we have MTIG ⊂MIG.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof follows from the argument given in the text and the fol-
lowing considerations: Suppose e1B1 − k ≥ 0. If IG offers A1 bu, IG receives a payoff of
uIG−bu = uIG−e1B1+k. If IG offers A1 b = 0, IG receives an expected payoff of (1−e1)uIG.
Hence, IG offers bu if, and only if, uIG ≥ B1 − k/e1.
Proof of Proposition 8. 1. From subsection 4.2, we know that if e1 ≥ e2ke2(B−uIG)−k , there
exists (B1, B2) such that effort on both tasks can be sustained under unbundling. We
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e2(B−uIG)−k if, and only if, Q(e2) := e
2
2B− e2(2B−uIG) + 2k < 0.
dQ
de2






















or at e2 = 1. Simple algebra shows that, if B > 2k + uIG, then Q(e2 =
2k+uIG
B








2 , pi, k, B, uIG)
such that effort is exerted on both tasks under bundling and strict incentives, yet effort
is not exerted on both tasks under unbundling.
Now choose any x ∈ S. This requires, in particular, that 1 ≥ e1 ≥ 2ke2B . Note that
we established in the proof of Proposition 4 that 2k
e2B
> e2k







Hence, there exists (B1, B2) such that effort is exerted on both tasks under unbundling
for any x ∈ S. It is easy to see that there exist uIG(e1, e2), uIG(e1, e2) ∈ [0, e2B)
such that 1 ≥ e1 = 2ke2B−uIG(e1,e2) and 1 ≥ e1 =
e2k
e2(B−uIG(e1,e2))−k . Because, whenever










, we have uIG(e1, e2) >
uIG(e1, e2). Moreover, as
2k
e2B−uIG is increasing on [0, e2B] , we have e1 <
2k
e2B−uIG for
all uIG > uIG(e1, e2), which implies that the Agent does not exert effort on both tasks
under bundling when uIG > uIG(e1, e2). Similarly, as
e2k
e2(B−uIG)−k is increasing in uIG,
we have e1 ≥ e2ke2(B−uIG)−k for all uIG ≤ uIG(e1, e2) and effort is exerted on both tasks
under unbundling.
2. Assume x ∈ M ∩ U . Then, by Proposition 13 if the Agent is bribed under bundling
he exerts effort on task 2. Hence, for the expected effort to be (weakly) higher on
task 2 under unbundling, we need e2B2 − k ≥ 0, or equivalently B2 ≥ k/e2. By
Proposition 7 the bribe that IG needs to pay to A1 to contract failure is bu = e1B1−k.
The allocation that maximizes bu, while sustaining a2 = 1 under unbundling is thus
(B1 = B − k/e2, B2 = k/e2). We then have bu = e1(B − k/e2) − k. If the Principal
uses the moderate retention rule, we have b = e1(1− e2)B − k (see Lemma 3). Simple









B− k/e2, B2 = k/e2), then IG bribes the Agent either (1) under neither institution, or
(2) under both, or (3) under bundling but not under unbundling, which implies that
expected effort on task 1 is strictly higher under unbundling. This establishes part 2.




. Then, if B2 ≥ k/e2 IG bribes the Agent
either (1) under neither institution, or (2) under both, or (3) under unbundling but not
under bundling, which implies that expected effort on task 1 is strictly higher under
bundling. If B2 < k/e2, Agent A2 does not exert effort on task 2, and expected effort
on task 2 is strictly higher under bundling. This establishes part 2. (a) of Proposition
8.
3. Follows from the proofs of propositions 4 and 5.
Proof of Proposition 9. Follows from arguments given in the text.
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all e2 < e
U




e2(B−uIG)−γk . Therefore, for all (e1, e2) such that e1 =
e2B
B−uIG
and e2 < e
U
2 (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) cannot be sustained in equilibrium under unbundling. Now let
eL2 and e
H
2 be the solutions to 1− k(2γ−1)e2B =
k(2γ−1)








B(B − uIG) +
√
B2(B − uIG)2 − 4B2k(2γ − 1)(B − uIG)
2B2
.




, we have eL2 < e
H
2 . Simple algebra also establishes that e
L
2
and eH2 also solve
e2B












(1−e2)B−uIG for all e2 ∈ (eL2 , eH2 ). Hence, for all (e1, e2) such that
e1 =
e2B






, there exists, following arguments given in the proof of






2 , pi) for which (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) can be
sustained in equilibrium under bundling with the Principal using the moderate retention
rule.




2 . It follows that if









, and for which, therefore, (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) can be sustained in equilibrium
under bundling, but not under unbundling. Now note that eL2 and e
H
2 are well defined,
continuous functions of γ if, and only if, B2(B − uIG)2− 4B2k(2γ − 1)(B − uIG) > 0, i.e. if,









> 1. eU2 is also a
continuous function of γ. By continuity, there exists γ > 1, such that for all γ < γ, eL2 < e
H
2
and eL2 < e
U
2 , which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 11. Remember that for an equilibrium to exist in which the Agent
exerts effort on both tasks under bundling, it must either (1) be the case that 1− k(2γ−1)
e2B
≥
e1 ≥ k(2γ−1)(1−e2)B−uIG or (2) the case that e1 ≥
2γk
e2B−uIG . As shown in the proof of Proposition 10,




the first case cannot occur. In turn, (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) can be sustained in
equilibrium under unbundling if, and only if, 1 ≥ e1 ≥ e2γke2(B−uIG)−γk . Notice that e1 ≥
2γk
e2B−uIG
and 1 ≥ e1 ≥ e2γke2(B−uIG)−γk can be satisfied if, and only if, γ <
B−uIG
2k
. Proceeding as in the




e2B−uIG and therefore 1 ≥ e1 >
e2γk
e2(B−uIG)−γk . Finally, notice that if
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